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last dozen years have seen a proliferation of customs unions and
free-trade areas of unforeseen proportions. Such regional arrangements, far from being halfway houses on the road to nondiscriminatory
and freer trade, may be in direct conffict with those goals. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been charged with the duty to regulate the
formation of customs unions and free-trade areas in order to reconcile that
conflict. The two principal conclusions of this discussion are that GATT has
failed to discharge that responsibility and that its failure may be traced to a
fundamental misconception of the nature and consequences of the conflict between regional arrangements and nondiscriminatory freer trade.
I.
The GATT counts among its Contracting Parties some forty-four nations
accounting for more than eighty per cent of international trade., The comerstone of the General Agreement is the most-favored-nation clause of article I.
That clause constitutes an undertaking by each contracting party to refrain
from discriminating with respect to such matters as tariffs and quantitative
restrictions; any concession accorded one contracting party must be accorded
* The author would like to thank Professors Walter Blum, Harry Johnson, Arthur
Shenfield and George Stigler for undertaking the laborious task of reading the manuscript
and for their many helpful comments.
t Associate Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.
1 See GATT, BAsIc INsTRuMENTs, Ilth Supp. (1963). In addition, several countries have
acceded provisionally to GATT and a number of countries, primarily former French
African colonies, are subject to GATT "on a de facto basis." Ibid. On the early history of
GATT and its stillborn predecessor, the International Trade Organization, see generally
GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMAcY (1956), and sources cited therein. On GATT
generally, see SEYID Mt lmmm, TE LEGAL FMmEwouK OF WORLD TRADE (1958).
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to every other contracting party. 2 Certain exceptions to this most-favorednation undertaking are set forth in the General Agreement. Perhaps the most
significant is that in article XXIV stating the conditions under which Contracting Parties may become members of customs unions and free-trade areas.
From one point of view, there could be no clearer denial of most-favorednation treatment than an agreement by two countries to eliminate all tariff
barriers between them while maintaining existing barriers toward third countries. Yet such an agreement would create nothing other than a free-trade
area which, assuming it conforms to certain standards set forth in article
XXIV, is exempt from the most-favored-nation obligation of article I. A customs union is merely a more highly developed version of a free-trade area in
which the member countries establish a single external tariff rather than, as in
the case of a free-trade area, maintaining existing national tariffs against non3
members.
The most familiar of the new regional economic groupings is, of course, the
European Economic Community (EEC), a customs union of six nations
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 4 The
same six countries had earlier formed an economic grouping limited to the
coal and steel industries known as the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and simultaneously with the formation of the EEC, created a special
organization for nuclear products known as EURATOM. Within the general
EEC framework these six have also entered into a free-trade area with a
large number of African and other nations and a special customs union,
referred to as an association, with Greece. Seven other European countries
(Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugual, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom) have formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and it
is in turn "associated" with Finland in a special free-trade area. In Latin
America two major blocs have been formed: The Latin American Free Trade
Association composed of seven South American countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Mexico); and the Central American
Common Market of five countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
2The most-favored-nation clause of article I reads: "With respect to customs duties and
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to
the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities
in connection with importation and exportation... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
3 For a discussion of the related question whether a customs union or free-trade area
agreement violates the most-favored-nation clause of a bilateral commercial treaty, see
Hay, The European Common Market and the Most-Favored-NationClause, 23 U. PrIT. L.
REV. 661 (1962).
4
Since Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had earlier formed the Benelux customs union, the EEC was made up of only four customs territories.
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Honduras and Nicaragua) which, although it comprises a much smaller portion of world trade than the other regional groupings, nevertheless promises
to be a decisive trading factor in the Central American area.
Each of the regional trading blocs just described is a going concern. In
addition, plans with varying degrees of definiteness have been drawn up for
a host of other regional groupings in Africa and Asia. Many are undoubtedly
paper plans with little chance of success. Others will collapse in the hard
bargaining which must precede the actual formation of any such grouping.
But some will no doubt succeed, thereby raising the question of compatibility
with article XXIV and straining still further the image of the most-favorednation regime foreseen by article 1.5
Article XXIV states the basic test in the case of a customs union, "or an
interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union." "Duties
and other regulations of commerce ...shall not on the whole be higher or
more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of
commerce [previously] applicable ... "6 The rule for a free-trade area or an
interim agreement leading to a free-trade area, parallels that for a customs
union in most respects, but because the member nations of a free-trade area
retain national tariffs, a somewhat different formulation is required. Here the
"duties and other regulations of commerce" are not to be "higher or more
restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce"
previously in effect.7
The requirements for elimination of restrictions between members are set
forth in the definition of customs unions and free-trade areas in article XXIVThus, where "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and
XX)s are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories ... in products originating in such territories," the
regional grouping may qualify as a customs union or free-trade area within
5A Working Party has already been established by the Contracting Parties to review
the Cairo agreement of April 1, 1962, for an African Common Market composed of Algeria,
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic. 15 INT'L FINANCIAL NEWS
SuRvEY 1 (Jan. 11, 1963).

6 GATT art. XXIV, para. 5(a). The full text of the relevant paragraphs of article XXIV
is set forth in the appendix.
7GATT, art. XXIV, para. 5(a). While certain differences in wording not strictly required
by the structural difference between a customs union and a free-trade area may be pointed
out, the only ones of significance are the omissions of the "on the whole" and "general incidence" concepts in the latter rule.
8The excepted regulations of commerce permitted under articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV and XX are restrictions adopted for such special purposes as classification, grading, or
marketing standards and regulations, art. XI, quantitative restrictions to safeguard a country's external financial position and balance of payments, arts. XII, XIV, and XV, and restrictions imposed for the protection of health and morals, art. XX.
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the meaning of those terms in article XXIV.9 The principal purpose of this requirement is to assure that the article XXIV exemption is not used to justify
preferential trading arrangements.
A special problem is presented by the creation of a customs union's common external tariff. The general principle of the tariff-negotiation provisions
of the General Agreement is that once a given duty is agreed upon, that duty is
"bound" against subsequent increase. In the creation of a common external
tariff, tariffs of relatively low-tariff countries will usually be increased, while
tariffs of relatively high-tariff countries will be decreased. Thus, some of the
duties which will be increased will already have been bound in prior GATT
tariff negotiations. Whatever the compatibility of the external tariff with the
"higher or more restrictive" standard, it would not be a fully satisfactory solution to permit the customs union to offset reductions in duties against increases in "bound" duties. The nonmember countries which benefit by the reductions will not always be the same as those which lose by the increases and,
in any event, the balance of benefits and losses will seldom be precisely the
same for any given nonmember country. The general provisions providing for,
in the case of increases in "bound" rates, compensatory adjustments in the
rates for other products are therefore made applicable to increases resulting
from creation of a common external tariff. In determining the appropriate
compensatory adjustment, however, "due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reductions brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union."0
Certain procedural requirements are included in article XXIV. Thus, members of a new customs union or free-trade area (or parties to an interim agreement) are required to notify GATT and to make available appropriate information to facilitate GATT review of the proposed arrangement.i Strict limitations are placed on the content and implementation of "interim agreements"
leading to customs unions and free-trade areas. It was not the intention of the
Contracting Parties to permit article XXIV to serve as a back-door route to
preferential trading arrangements not constituting full-fledged customs unions
or free-trade areas. On the other hand, it was impractical to require major
regional groupings to spring over night into fully developed form. An interim
agreement is required, therefore, to include a "plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time." The Contracting Parties are granted power to review
such plans and schedules, in the light of the information to be provided by the
9Art. XXIV, paras. 8(a), 8(b). Reference is made to the full text of paragraph 8 in the
appendix infra, for certain differences in definitions with respect to intermember trade.
These differences do not appear to be of operative significance.
10Art. XXIV, para. 6.
11

Art. XXIV, para. 7(a). The treaty language is somewhat ambiguous on the type and
quantity of information required.
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parties to the interim agreements, and to "make recommendations" if they
shall find that "such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the
parties to the agreement" or if they shall find that "such period is not a
reasonable one." The term "recommendations" is perhaps misleading because parties to an interim agreement are forbidden to implement it "if they
are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations."
Moreover, the plan or schedule may not be changed without consultation "if
the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the
12
customs union or of the free-trade area."
If a single adjective were to be chosen to describe article XXIV, that adjective would be "deceptive." First, the standards established are deceptively
concrete and precise; any attempt to apply the standards to a specific situation
reveals ambiguities which, to use an irresistible metaphor, go to the heart of
the matter. Second, while the rule appears to be carefully conceived, the principles enunciated make little economic sense. Third, the dismaying experience
of the Contracting Parties has been that no customs union or free-trade area
agreement presented for review has complied with article XXIV and yet every
such agreement has been approved by a tacit or explicit waiver.
II.
Article XXIV appears, on first impression, to set forth a precise set of rules
for determining the circumstances under which regional arrangements will be
permitted. The apparent precision is quite illusory.
Perhaps the most troublesome ambiguity in article XXIV lies in the requirement that, in the case of a customs union, "duties and other regulations
of commerce imposed [on external trade] shall not on the whole be higher or
more restrictivethan the generalincidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such
union ... "13 The general intent is clear and, while difficult to state in more
specific terms than the treaty language itself, the intent simply is that, on balance, external trade barriers should not be raised in the process of creating the
customs union.
The process of calculating a common external tariff to be applied both to
high-tariff and low-tariff countries gives rise to troublesome problems of interpretation. A principal decision to be made is whether the words "on the
whole" and "general incidence" refer to each item in the common external
tariff schedule or to the common external tariff schedule as a whole. If the
12 Art. XXIV, para. 7(c).
Art. XXIV, para. 5(a). (Emphasis added.) A similar test is specified for a free-trade area
but since establishment of a free-trade area does not presuppose the creation of common
external tariff, fewer practical difficulties are presented. The ambiguities are nonetheless as
far-reaching as in the case of customs unions. Art. XXIV, para. 5(b).
13
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latter alternative is chosen, one must still determine if the initial step is to calculate the height and restrictiveness of each national tariff schedule and then
to strike some kind of average between these national levels (as, for example,
by calculating a "height" index for each country, taking an average of the
indices in order to determine an index for the common external tariff and then
working backward to calculate a schedule of external duties which will not in
the aggregate exceed the "height" of that average). Or is one first to strike
some union-wide average for each tariff classification and then to determine
the aggregate height of a common external tariff composed of these unionwide averages, the customs union being free to assign any tariff to individual
items in the common external tariff as long as the calculated union index is
not exceeded?
Whichever alternative is chosen, the unfortunate fact is that one cannot determine from nominal percentage rates the restrictive impact that a duty may
have. A relatively high duty may provide excess protection in the sense that it
may be higher than necessary to eliminate all trade in the commodity in question. When one attempts to reach a judgment as to the overall restrictiveness
of a schedule of duties, the assigning of weights to individual duties raises
troublesome problems because the most convenient criterion for assigning
weights, the respective volume of trade for each item, tends to be a function
of, rather than independent of, the restrictiveness of the duty. To put these
difficulties more concretely, some of the questions which must be answered in
any calculation of a common external tariff are: (1) How does one average a
tariff and no tariff? For example, if one were determining the "height" of a
two-item schedule, one item having no duty and the other having a fifty per
cent duty, would the average height be a simple twenty-five per cent? (2) How
does one average a protective tariff and a revenue tariff? For example, if in a
two-item schedule, each item were to bear a ten per cent duty and if for one
item a ten per cent duty would be sufficient, in view of domestic production,
to exclude all imports while for the other item a ten per cent duty had little or
no effect on the volume of imports (because, for instance, the item could not
feasibly be produced domestically), would it mean anything to say that the
average "height" was ten per cent? And if the protective tariff were to be
raised to fifty per cent in order to be multiply certain that no imports competed with domestic production, would the average be the arithmetic mean of
thirty per cent or still only ten per cent on the theory that a ten per cent level
on the protected item was sufficient to exclude all imports? (3) How does one
average tariffs for items with greatly different volumes of imports? For example, should one use a simple average or a weighted average for two items
where the volume of imports is much greater for one item than for the other?
And if one decides to use a weighted average, how does one weight duties
which, for example, are high enough to eliminate all trade? (4) How does one
average tariffs between countries? Here the problem is not simply whether to
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take a simple or a weighted average but, in the latter case, how to apply the
weights-by level of actual imports, by level of potential imports assuming nil
tariffs, or by some measure of the size of the national markets such as gross
national product. 14
These questions are not merely statistical puzzlers. As Loveday has made
clear in his discussion of the calculation of the common external tariff of the
European Economic Community, the method of calculation can have a
dramatic effect on the composition of the common external tariff schedule.15
Given a customs union composed of countries of sharply different economic
sizes and propensities to import, each with tariffs on different combinations of
items and each with a disparate mixture of protective and revenue tariffs, it
would not be going too far to say that the language of article XXIV gives no
guidance at all. Finally, even if these statistical problems can be solved satisfactorily, and assuming quantitative restrictions are included within the terms
"duties and other regulations of commerce," 16 one must weigh quantitative
restrictions against tariffs, a task which if not impossible at least requires an
unverifiable estimate of what tariff level would restrict imports to the levels
permitted by particular quotas.17
No official interpretation exists. The text of an early draft of article XXIV
using the terms "shall not on the whole be higher or more stringent than the
average level," while perhaps slightly more certain of application, is of little
assistance since we cannot be certain what substantive change was intended
by the subsequent amendment. To be sure, the Havana Reports indicate that
the intention was that the article "should not require a mathematical average of customs duties but should permit greater flexibility so that the volume
of trade may be taken into account." 18 But to concede that no one method
of calculation is required is not to state which methods are forbidden.
Further ambiguity lies in the meaning of the requirement that, in order for
14 Further problems arise from differences in the tariff classification system of member
states but these problems, though difficult, are in principle subject to rather precise solution.
The problems set forth in the text, on the other hand, involve ambiguities in the standard to
be used.
15 Loveday, Article XXIV of the GATT Rules, 11 EcoNoMIA INTERNAzlONALE 1 (1958).
16 This is a further ambiguity in the treaty language. Although in normal parlance a
quantitative restriction is surely a "regulation of commerce," it is arguable on the basis of a
close textual analysis, that the term "regulation of commerce" has a more limited meaning.
17 This task is doubly difficult with respect to certain types of products and commodities.
For example, assume quotas are imposed on luxury goods for balance-of-payments purposes
by a country with a substantial population of wealthy individuals. Is it really possible to determine what tariff level would keep the quantity of imports of, let us say, diamonds at a
specified low level?
Is GAIT, ANALYTnCAL INDEX OF THE GENERAL AGP.EENT ON TARIffs AND TRADE 103

(Doc. No. MGT (59) 91) (rev. ed. 1959). Loveday is surely wrong where he construes the
interpretative note to require a weighted average. Even the French text from which he apparently worked hardly warrants such a construction. See Loveday, supra note 15, at 2.
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a regional grouping to qualify as a customs union or free-trade area under
article XXIV, "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce [must be]
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories .... ."19 Quite aside from the obvious ambiguity as to what percentage constitutes "substantially al" trade, several more troublesome questions arise. Assume, for example, that it might be agreed (as has sometimes
been suggested 20) that eighty per cent is "substantially all" trade. Is the only
proper reading of this language that internal tariffs must be eliminated on
eighty per cent of all trade? Or might the test also be satisfied by reducing all
internal tariffs to twenty per cent of their earlier levels? An affirmative answer
would permit the establishment of a preferential trading arrangement in
derogation of what appears to be the common understanding as to the purpose
of the General Agreement. 21 Again, assume that tariffs and other restrictions
were totally eliminated on eighty per cent of internal trade but that several
major industries, comprising say the remaining twenty per cent of internal
trade, were totally excluded from the scope of the customs union or free-trade
area. Would the "substantially all" test be met? As we shall see, if the answer
to that question is yes, as has frequently been argued, creation of the regional
groupings may be greatly more favorable to some members, and much more
injurious to many nonmembers, of the regional grouping than if no major
sectors of the economy were totally excluded from the internal tariff cut.
in.
While article XXIV does not set forth its rationale, it is not too difficult to
surmise the underlying theory. The General Agreement has two grand designs: That free trade be promoted through multilateral tariff negotiation and
that discrimination be eliminated by means of the most-favored-nation principle. For the draftsmen of the General Agreement, customs unions and freetrade areas produced a conflict between those two goals. Such regional groupings seemed to be movements toward free trade to the extent that tariffs were
lowered between member countries, but they also seemed to involve discrimination against nonmember countries. The solution adopted by the draftsmen
was to permit customs unions provided the plans went all the way toward unfettered trade by full elimination of barriers on "substantially all" intermember trade, even though, in a sense, discrimination was thus increased, but to
assure through the "higher or more restrictive" criterion that creation of the
customs union or free-trade area was not seized upon as an opportunity to
raise tariffs against nonmembers beyond the preexisting level.
What may not have been appreciated at the time of the drafting of the
General Agreement was that customs unions and free-trade areas need not
19 Art. XXIV, paras. 8(a), 8(b).
20 GAIT, BASIc INsmRUmNTS, 6th Supp., at 99 (1958).
21
See, e.g., WiIcox, A CHARTER Fop WoRmD Taa 46-47 (1949).
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involve movements toward free trade. They may just as easily be, and perhaps
in view of the widespread propensity toward protectionism are more likely to
be, movements away from free trade. In order to determine the direction of
any given customs union proposal, one must first isolate the fundamental
justification for the free trade position. In general, that justification is that the
most efficient allocation of resources for the world as a whole will be achieved
by the elimination of tariffs and other arbitrary barriers to trade. In determining whether a customs union is a movement toward or away from free trade,
it might seem elementary that an appropriate preliminary inquiry would be
whether creation of the customs union would lead to a better, or poorer, allocation of world resources than previously existed. To be sure, it may be
difficult to measure the amplitude of any changes in the efficiency of allocation but at least a rough estimate of the direction of change might be made. 22
It has only been since 1950, under the stimulus of a few pages in a book by
Professor Jacob Viner, 23 that serious thought has been given to the conditions
under which allocation of world resources will be improved by creation of a
customs union or free-trade area. Unfortunately, the work done thus far has
been borne solely by economists and appears to have attracted little attention
from lawyers or from men engaged in day-to-day work involving regional
groupings. 24 Such parochialism has been unfortunate. In particular, as I shall
attempt to show below, this thinking failed, with quite limited exceptions, to
have any impact on the work of the Contracting Parties in their application of
article XXIV. The misconceived premises of article XXIV have so dominated
the Contracting Parties in reviewing proposed customs unions and free-trade
areas under that article that their discussions have been dominated by issues
irrelevant to the basic question of the impact of the regional grouping on allocation of world resources. Moreover, no attention has been given to the need
for revamping article XXIV which would seem to be required as a result of the
economists' work. Finally, economists have also suffered from this lack of demand for their work product; while considerable economic literature has been
devoted to the economic effects of eliminating intermember tariffs, little has
been devoted to the economic effects of creating a common external tariff.25
22
Improvement in the efficiency of allocation of world resources is important because it
involves an increase in the wealth of the world as a whole. It is important to bear in mind
the elementary distinction between the wealth of the world as a whole and the wealth of the
member countries of a customs union or free-trade area. It is possible, as we shall see, for a
group of countries, through creation of a customs union or free-trade area, to improve their
own lot at the expense of the rest of the world, and it is precisely the danger of such action

which requires some rule on the subject in the General Agreement.
23
VNER, TiH CUsTOMS UNION Issun 41-56 (1950).
24 One important exception is FRANK, Tim EUROPEAN COMMON MAPK=T (1961), a book

written by a United States Department of State official who is, it should be noted, an
economist by training.
25 The following books and articles in the economic literature have been particularly
helpful in the analysis which follows and are not cited specially on each point: BALASSA,
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Without plunging into a full-scale discussion of the conditions for optimum
allocation of resources, it may be observed that in the most general terms a primary criterion is that there be no divergences between prices paid by consumers and costs incurred by producers. Such a goal may be achieved only if,

among other conditions, (1) consumers make purchases on the basis of relative prices to be paid by them, both as between domestic and foreign sources
and as among various foreign sources, rather than on the basis of other
criteria-such as might be important, for example, in the case of quantitative
controls-and (2) such relative prices paid by consumers do not diverge from
prices received by producers. Assuming the former condition is met, the
principal barrier to achievement of the latter condition will be the existence
of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. 26 While many internal policies and
practices both in importing and exporting countries may create other kinds of
divergences between prices paid by consumers and costs incurred by producers-monopolies, cartels and local direct and indirect taxes, for examplethe primary international barriers to optimization of allocation of world re27
sources are tariffs and quantitative restrictions.
Putting to one side for the moment the question of quantitative restrictions,
it is important to observe at the outset that in a tariff-divided world the elimiTHE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961); MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS

(1955); 2 MEADE, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc POLICY (TRADE AND WELFARE) (1955); H.G. JOHNSON, The Economic Theory of Customs Union, MONEY, TRADE AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH 46 (1962); Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey,
70 ECONOMIC J. 496 (1960); Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of SecondBest, 24 Rav.
OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 11 (1956).
26 For example, a tariff produces a divergence between prices paid by consumers and

prices received by producers by the amount of the tariff. If in country A producers receive
$100 per unit from domestic consumers and country B has a $50 tariff, country B consumers
will pay $150 per unit (assuming no price discrimination by country A producers), while
country A producers will receive only $100. The divergence is $50 per unit, the amount of
the tariff. Quantitative restrictions involve a more complicated situation because, by limiting
imports to a specified quantity, country B artificially limits supply and hence induces a rise in
price in country B above the price in country A by an amount which is difficult to determine
in advance.
The foregoing analysis should not obscure the fundamental fact that the economic costs
of protection, whether by way of tariff or quantitative restrictions, are incurred by domestic
consumers in the form of prices paid on purchases from domestic producers. The tariff or
quantitative restriction prevents domestic consumers from buying lower cost foreign goods.

See H.G. Johnson, The Cost of Protectionand the Scientific Tariff, 68 J. POL. ECON. 327
(1960).
27 Export duties are fully as significant as a theoretical matter as tariffs, i.e., import
duties, in producing a divergence between prices paid by consumers and prices received by
producers, but export duties are ignored in the following discussion for ease of exposition.
This simplification is justified, it is believed, both because export duties are less frequent in
practice than import duties and because the analysis involved would not be fundamentally
different if export duties were considered.
It should also be recognized that, quite aside from the restrictions on trade in goods
referred to in the text, restrictions on the free movement of capital and labor are important
sources of inefficiency in the international economy. See discussion pp. 628-29 infra.
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nation of any particular tariff or set of tariffs need not, contrary to what
might appear the common-sense conclusion, lead to an improvement in the
allocation of world resources.2 8 This fundamental point may be illustrated by
taking a hypothetical free-trade area in which we may observe the position of
consumers in one member country with respect to purchases of goods from
producers in nonmember countries (nonmember goods and producers), from
producers in other member countries (member goods and producers) and
from producers within the same country (local goods and producers). If the
effect of eliminating intermember tariffs is to cause consumers to shift purchases of a particular commodity from relatively low-cost nonmember producers to relatively high-cost member producers, the impact of the creation of
the free-trade area will be to that extent unfortunate for the efficiency of allocation of world resources. Before creation of the free-trade area, tariffs were
presumably applied equally against all countries and, therefore, while the
prices paid by consumers included the duty, nevertheless the relative levels of
the prices paid by consumers reflected relative prices to producers for all
foreign sources of supply. After elimination of interarea tariffs, it may be that
even though prices to producers are identical, prices to consumers will be
higher for purchases of nonmember goods, on which a duty must be paid,
than for purchases of member goods, on which no duty need be paid.
On the other hand, the elimination of tariffs between members of the freetrade area may tend to shift purchases of a particular commodity from relatively high-cost local producers to relatively low-cost member producers. In
that case the impact of creation of the free-trade area will be to that extent
beneficial for the allocation of world resources. Such a shift would normally
occur where prior to creation of the free-trade area the duty exceeded the difference between prices received by high-cost local producers and prices received by low-cost foreign producers.
These two shifts in source of production-from low-cost nonmember producers to high-cost member producers and from high-cost local producers to
low-cost member producers-thus have diametrically opposed consequences
for the allocation of world resources, the former unfavorable or "trade divert29
ing" and the latter favorable or "trade creating."
These effects may be classified as production effects since they refer to the
impact of the creation of a free-trade area on sources of production, assuming
no changes in consumption. They should be contrasted with consumption
effects which refer to the impact on consumption of the creation of a free28 See generally 2 MEADE, op. cit. supra note 25, especially at 8-9, 102, 565-66; Ozga,
An Essay in the Theory of Tariffs, 63 J. POL. ECON. 489 (1955).
29 VINER, op. cit. supra note 23, used the terms "trade diverting" and "trade creating" to
describe these divergent production effects. The terms, while often used in the literature, are

somewhat obsolescent since, in view of his assumption that consumption was unchangeable
as between various countries, Viner failed to take account of the consumption effects hereafter described.
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trade area. It is useful to think of production effects as involving local consumers' choices among local, member and nonmember sources of the same
kind of goods and consumption effects as involving local consumers' choices
among different kinds of goods, using the terms local goods, member goods
and nonmember goods to differentiate the respective sources of such different kinds of goods.30 We start with the proposition that the price paid
by a consumer for foreign goods subject to a tariff necessarily equals the
price received by the foreign seller plus the amount of the tariff.31The elimination of tariffs on imports from member countries coupled with retention of
tariffs on imports from nonmember countries will tend to alter the relationships of prices to consumers between, respectively, (1) local goods and member goods, and (2) member goods and nonmember goods, but not between
(3) local goods and nonmember goods. That is to say, the ratio of prices paid
for local goods as against member goods (and member goods as against nonmember goods) will be altered by creation of the free-trade area, but the ratio
of prices between local goods and nonmember goods will not be altered. To
put the matter differently, consumers will tend to find prices of member goods
cheaper, relative to the pre-free-trade area situation, than either local goods or
nonmember goods. Consumers may be led to purchase more member goods
than before creation of the free-trade area, and this increase may come partly
at the expense of local producers and partly at the expense of nonmember producers.
The substitution of member goods for local goods will be favorable, and
the substitution of member goods for nonmember goods unfavorable, for the
allocation of world resources. The favorable shift from local goods to member
goods may be examined first. Prior to creation of the free-trade area, consumers' choices between local and member goods were affected by the tariff,
producing a disparity between prices paid by consumers and prices received
by producers with respect to member goods and hence a demand for local
goods which was uneconomic in terms of real costs of resources. After creation of the free-trade area, prices paid by consumers and prices received by
producers will be equal for purchases of both local and member goods, a situation more favorable to an optimum allocation of resources than that which
obtained prior to creation of the free-trade area.
The substitution of member goods for nonmember goods, on the other
hand, may be unfavorable for the allocation of world resources. Here the application of the tariff to nonmember goods may tend to cause an uneconomic
demand for member goods. To be sure, under pre-free-trade area conditions
the basis for consumers' choices between member and nonmember goods was
The distinction is something of an oversimplification. See note 32 infra.
31 Transportation and similar costs are treated, for the purpose of this analysis, as incurred by foreign producers in order to make clear that buyers include such costs in choosing between various sources of goods.
30
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not fully satisfactory because the tariff, which was equally applicable to each,
caused a divergence between prices paid and prices received with respect to
each. Nevertheless, in ordinary circumstances it may be that an equal divergence with respect to alternative foreign sources (the situation prior to the freetrade area) would tend to produce a more economic consumers' choice than
would a divergence with respect to only one foreign source (the situation after
creation of the free-trade area). It must be recognized, however, that each of
these situations is inferior to one in which all foreign sources are free from
divergences between prices paid by consumers and prices received by pro32
ducers-the utopian conditions of world free trade.
Every proposed free-trade area or customs union will involve, in all likelihood, each of the four types of effects just discussed: Favorable production,
unfavorable production, favorable consumption and unfavorable consumption effects. 3 3 The problem is to determine whether these effects are on balance

favorable or unfavorable for the world as a whole. From one perspective this
weighing process presents a prodigious task, a task of perhaps impossible
difficulty for any international organization. The effect of the free-trade area
or customs union on every product, commodity and service would have to be
taken into account in order fully to discharge this task. It does not follow,
however, that because a rational standard is complicated, a less rational
standard such as that contained within article XXIV should be adopted. In
view of the irrelevance of the standards of article XXIV to the basic inquiry,
certain simplifications and short-cuts might be justified in establishing new
32 It will be noted that production and consumption effects have certain similarities.
Both result from a change in price ratios among local, member and nonmember goods. But
reference to production effects is intended to isolate the impact on the distribution of productive facilities throughout the world, while reference to consumption effects is intended to
isolate the efficiency of consumers' purchases, measuring such efficiency in the only feasible
manner-by the relative costs of various types and sources of goods. The two terms may be
used to refer to the same phenomenon when the shift in source occurs with respect to identical goods. In order to avoid double counting, we have, as has been conventional in the economic literature, restricted references to consumption effects to situations in which shifts
occur as between different kinds of goods. It should be noted, however, that consumption
effects will tend to encourage production of the benefited goods in member countries, and
hence will have an effect on production. This observation further emphasizes that production and consumption effects, in the sense in which those terms have been used, are not
strictly speaking different in kind. See H.G. Johnson, Discriminatory Tariff Reduction: A
MarshaianAnalysis, 38 INDIAN J. OF EcoNoNucS 39 (1957); H.G. JoHNsoN, op. cit. supra
note 25, at 53 n.l1.
33 The existence of many internal policies and conditions in one or more countries, such
as monopolies and internal taxes, which cause a divergence between prices received by a
producer and costs incurred by that producer, have an independent impact on the allocation
of world resources and, if every factor were to be taken into account, such internal divergences might lead one to conclude that a particular production and consumption effect
which appeared to be favorable was in fact unfavorable or vice versa. But these complicating
circumstances have been ignored here on the grounds that the impact of such internal
divergences is often marginal and problematical and, in any event, usually beyond any
influence by the Contracting Parties. See MEADE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 565-66.
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standards-such as excluding from the scope of GATT deliberations products
playing minor roles in international trade. Moreover, a number of general
principles can be deduced from the foregoing analysis of production and consumption effects which might serve as rules of thumb for the Contracting
Parties in administering a revised article XXIV. For convenience of exposition, these principles are set forth on the assumption that the free-trade area
involves two countries only, although the principles would appear to be
equally valid for a multination grouping.
Production effects are favorable, as we have seen, where low-cost member
goods replace high-cost local goods. Since creation of a free-trade area is most
likely to constitute a movement toward free trade where, other things being
equal, favorable production effects are maximized, our search for standards
should be directed toward the conditions under which maximum favorable
production effects may be expected. Any attempt to measure favorable production effects would have to take into account two principal dimensionsthe quantity of trade which displaces local production and the difference in
unit prices to producers between the displaced local production and the displacing member production. We may therefore conclude that, in general,
favorable production effects of a proposed free-trade area will be greater, the
larger the range of goods produced in both of the member countries and the
greater the differential in prices to producers between the two member countries. The differential in prices may be roughly gauged by the height of the preunion tariff; the higher that tariff, the greater will be the favorable production
effects of a proposed free-trade area.
Unfavorable production effects, on the other hand, arise from substitution
of high-cost member goods for low-cost nonmember goods. We may therefore
conclude that, in general, unfavorable production effects of a proposed freetrade area will be smaller, the smaller the range of goods produced in both
member and nonmember countries and the lower the differential in prices
to producers between member and nonmember countries. Again, the latter
criterion may be rephrased to state that the lower the tariffs against nonmember goods, the smaller will be the unfavorable production effects of a proposed
free-trade area.
Consumption effects, it will be recalled, are favorable with respect to consumer choices between local and member goods but may be unfavorable with
respect to consumer choices between member and nonmember goods. We may
therefore conclude that the smaller the range of goods imported from nonmember countries relative to the range of goods imported from member countries, the smaller the unfavorable and the greater the favorable consumption
effects.
The foregoing discussion has been concerned with tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions. The elimination of intermember quantitative restrictions
is quite a different matter, so far as allocation of world resources is concerned,
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from the elimination of intermember tariffs. 34 The elimination of quantitative
restrictions among members will be favorable for the allocation of world resources in all cases, even though quantitative restrictions are maintained on
imports from nonmember countries. 3s To explain this paradoxical conclusion,
it is necessary to examine two types of situations. First, elimination of intermember quantitative restrictions, coupled with retention of quantitative restrictions against nonmember countries, may produce one of two consequences. First, it may permit additional imports of member goods at the
expense of local goods. This result would involve favorable production effects. Second, it may permit additional imports of member goods at the expense of nonmember goods, but this result would occur only where prices to
consumers are lower for both member and nonmember goods than for local
goods (that is, only where in the absence of both quantitative restrictions and
tariffs, there would be no local production). If member goods displace nonmember goods, it must be either because prices to producers are lower in
member than in nonmember countries or because a tariff against nonmember
goods is sufficiently high to offset lower prices to producers in nonmember
countries. In the former case, the production and consumption effects are
favorable. In the latter case, it is, strictly speaking, the tariff and not the
elimination of quantitative restrictions which produces the unfavorable pro36
duction effects.
The difference between a free-trade area and a customs union is obvious
but has been largely overlooked in the economic literature. If the tariffs of
member countries were identical, formation of a free-trade area would have
the same economic consequences as formation of a customs union. But where
tariffs differ in the member countries, formation of a customs union may, because of the necessity of creating a common external tariff, lead to sharply
different consequences from formation of a free-trade area. Economic theory
34
Quantitative export restrictions are ignored in the text, but the analysis is not fundamentally different from that used for quantitative import restrictions.
35

The text ignores situations where quantitative restrictions are superfluous, i.e., where

the quantity of imports permitted exceeds actual imports with respect to a given product or
commodity. Such legal restrictions should not be considered restrictions in fact for the purpose of the analysis in the text.
36 To put the latter point differently, if there were no tariffs against nonmember goods or
equal tariffs against both member and nonmember goods, the elimination of quantitative
restrictions against member goods would cause member goods to displace nonmember goods
only in situations where prices to producers were lower in member than in nonmember
countries. The displacement of nonmember goods which may be attributed to elimination of
quantitative restrictions therefore involves favorable, rather than unfavorable, production
effects.
It would seem that the consumption effects of elimination of quantitative restrictions between the two member countries, but not against nonmember countries, must also tend to be
favorable in all cases. The analysis would parallel that for production effects, except that
we are by hypothesis considering the impact on consumer choices between different kinds
of goods.
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is of very little assistance here because economists, in that new subdivision of
economic theory known as the theory of customs unions, have been dealing
with free-trade areas rather than customs unions. The economic impact of
discriminatory tariff reduction has been studied to the exclusion of the eco3
nomic impact of the alignment of external tariffs of two or more countries. 7
The creation of the common external tariff may involve (1) increasing all
duties, (2) increasing some and decreasing other duties or (3) decreasing all
duties. Under article XXIV, assuming other requirements are met, only customs unions of the third category are clearly lawful. Where some external
duties are raised and others lowered, the ambiguous "higher or more restrictive" test must be applied. 38 The common-sense notion underlying article
XXIV is, of course, that so long as the common external tariff is no higher
than were the members' tariffs collectively, one may conclude that the creation of the common external tariff has not been restrictive. But once we adopt
as our principal measure of lawfulness whether creation of the customs union
is a movement toward or away from free trade, we may no longer adhere to
such a simplistic notion. A customs union involving the lowering of all external duties may be a movement away from free trade whereas a customs
union involving the raising of all external duties may be a movement toward
free trade. The direction of the movement depends on the combined effect of
the elimination of internal barriers and the changes in the external barriers.
Our task would be simplified if we could be certain that aside from the effects of elimination of internal barriers, every decrease in an external duty
involved a movement toward free trade and every increase a movement away
from free trade. But just as we could not be certain that the elimination of
trade barriers between member countries improved the allocation of world
resources, so we cannot be certain of the effect of increasing or decreasing any
individual duty on the efficiency of allocation of world resources. Given a
world economy filled with divergences between prices to consumers and costs
to producers such as tariffs, quantitative restrictions, taxes, subsidies and
monopolies, it is not necessarily true that the reduction of any individual tariff
(that is, the reduction pro tanto of those divergences) will actually improve
37 For examples of such "customs union" literature, see, e.g., Lipsey, The Theory of
Customs Unions: A GeneralSurvey, 70 ECONOMIC J. 496 (1960), a paper purporting to be "a
survey of the development of customs-union theory from Viner to date," and MEADE, Tim
THEoRY or CusToms UNIoNs (1955). As a lawyer, I do not pretend to have read the entire
economic literature, but a considerable survey did not reveal any systematic analysis addressed to the consequences of creation of a common external tariff. To be sure, some
economists have considered alternative methods of applying the "higher or more restrictive" test of article XXIV, e.g., Loveday, supra note 15, but that is not necessarily the same
question. Also different is the question of the method to be used in determining the "height"
of a tariff. See BAASSA, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 44-49; VINER, The Measurement of the
"Height" of TariffLevels, INr'L EcoNoMIcS 161-68 (1951). But see, some comments on the
impact of European integration on Canada in Reuber, Western Europe'sDemandfor Canadian IndustrialMaterials,28 CAN. J. OF ECONOMIC & POL. Sci. 16 (1962).
38 See discussion at p. 619 supra.
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the allocation of world resources. 39 Nevertheless, where we are dealing not
with any individual duty but with the entire range of duties of a group of countries (as we inevitably are in assessing the common external tariff of a customs
union), it may well be that a reduction in the external tariff as a whole will
usually be accompanied by an improvement in the allocation of world resources. 40 In that sense article XXIV's "higher or more restrictive" test may
contain a large element of wisdom. But even if we assume that a high correlation does exist, we are still left with the conclusion that the effect of creation
of the common external tariff should be placed in the balance with the effect
of the reduction of internal tariffs and quantitative restrictions in determining
whether a customs union as a whole is a movement toward or away from free
trade. 41 Where the one effect is favorable, and the other unfavorable, for the
allocation of world resources, we have no developed techniques for striking

that balance.
In weighing production and consumption effects, we have been considering
only the elimination of restrictions on manufactured goods and commodities.
Once improvement of the allocation of resources is adopted as the decisive
39See 2 MEADE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 513-20; Ozga, supra note 28, at 489; see generally Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 25.
40 The conclusions of Professor Meade seem particularly wise: "inhere are strong theoretical reasons why in many cases one particular tariff or other trade control should not be
removed so long as some other particular tariff or trade control or domestic duty or other
divergence between marginal values and costs remains in operation....
"There can be no question about the validity of this argument. Yet as a precept for practical policy, the present author at least does not find it very compelling.... [Ihere remains
a general presumption that a removal of a trade barrier will have good rather than bad effects.... The presumption should always be in favor of taking steps to reduce.., other
divergencies rather than of maintaining a particular barrier to offset the effect of... other
divergencies. It must always be remembered that the lowering of any one particular barrier
will generally increase the chances that good rather than evil will come out of lowering of
any other barrier to trade." 2 MEADE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 565-66.
41One problem of some practical importance arises from the circumstance that the General Agreement is a multilateral instrument involving mutual rights and obligations. Thus,
even where a customs union fully complies with the requirements of article XXIV, nonmember contracting parties are entitled under paragraph 6 to compensation for any duty which
is increased in the process of creating the common external tariff, subject to the general
principle that any duties reduced in that process are to be taken into account. The right to
such compensation is personal to each contracting party. Normally compensation will take
the form of reduction of duties on goods which are important exports of the injured contracting party (which reduction must be generalized to all contracting parties under the
most-favored-nation principle). Since the decisive question in determining the right to compensation is the impact of increase in particular duties with respect to particular contracting
parties, it may be that, even though a customs union in which every external duty was increased might theoretically be a movement toward free trade, concessions might nonetheless have to be given to other contracting parties. Such may indeed be the result of the
scheme of rights and duties underlying the present General Agreement. One can only observe that the present compensation arrangements under article XXIV are illogical since
they require the customs union to grant compensation for injuries arising to third parties
from the creation of the common external tariff but not for similar injuries arising from the
discriminatory elimination of internal tariffs.
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test for the legality of a customs union under the General Agreement, a question arises whether the extent to which restrictions are eliminated on the free
movement of labor and capital should be taken into account. Article XXIV,
while requiring elimination of barriers on "substantially all" trade, does not
require any reduction whatever of restrictions on mobility of labor or capital.
But if elimination of such restrictions tends to promote more efficient allocation of world resources, then surely any steps taken in that direction by a customs union should be considered a favorable factor in weighing the compatability of the customs union with the most-favored-nation clause of the
General Agreement.42 However, if the effect of creation of a customs union is
unfavorable, it is doubtful that freeing of labor and capital would often be
sufficient to make creation of the union favorable, on balance, for the allocation of world resources. Perhaps a workable rule would be to exclude the
effects of such liberalization from the scope of the Contracting Parties' deliberations except where it is impossible to make anyjudgment on the basis of
4
the foregoing production and consumption effects. 3
Quite aside from the criteria thus far discussed, it may be desirable to take
into account certain other economic effects of creation of customs unions
which may have some bearing on the degree of efficiency of world resources. 44
For example, national tariff walls may well preclude the achievement of the
most efficient scale of output for firms. As the size of the market expands
through elimination of barriers between member countries, expansion of firms
and plants may occur to exploit those formerly unexploited economies of
scale. While economies of scale to be enjoyed by creation of a customs union
42 It must be recognized in determining the weight to be attached to elimination of restrictions on the free movement of labor and capital that the result sought to be accomplished-in economic terms, the equalization of the price of factors of production among
countries-may under certain circumstances be accomplished solely by the elimination of
restrictions on trade. See BALAssA, op. cit. supra note 25, at 80-98.
43 The conclusions concerning elimination of restrictions on capital and labor would
seem applicable to a free-trade area as well as a customs union. As a practical matter, however, such elimination is more likely to accompany a customs union than a free-trade area.
4
4 There is one sense in which every customs union will tend to improve the allocation of
world resources. By eliminating the necessity of customs administration on transactions between member countries, resources are freed for more productive undertakings. Even this
principle must be qualified, however, because to the extent that the internal tariffs produced
revenue and were not purely protective, some judgment must be made concerning the economic effects of alternative methods of raising the lost revenue.
Whether any similar improvement in the allocation of world resources can be claimed for
the free-trade area is doubtful. Here the national customs administrations cannot easily be
replaced by a single administration since the member countries retain their independent
commercial policies. Moreover, the risks of transshipment inherent in a free-trade area require that some administrative systems for determining origin, or some system of countervailing duties, be established. See BAJASsA, op. cit. supra note 25, at 69-79; OEEC, REPORT
ON THE Possmirirry OF CREATING A FREE TRADE AREA IN EuRoPE 11-12, 31-41 (1957). This

additional complicating factor will most likely dissipate any administrative saving from the
elimination of intermember tariffs.
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will be of benefit primarily to member countries, they are nonetheless relevant
to the efficiency of the resources of the world as a whole. On the other hand,
the increase of efficiency to be expected from this source would seem to be
rather minor for most customs union projects 4S and in any event extremely

difficult to predict. Therefore economies of scale might well, except in unusual
circumstances, be excluded from formal GATT consideration. 46 In any event
the burden of coming forward and the burden of proof with respect to gains
of this variety ought to be placed on the members of the customs union.
Preferential arrangements which involve partial rather than complete elimination of intermember tariffs are absolutely forbidden by the General Agreement, except insofar as the grandfather clauses of article I exempt preferential
agreements previously in existence. Since the tariff reduction inherent in such
a preferential arrangement might be considered a movement toward free
trade, albeit not so dramatic as that produced by a customs union or free-trade
area, and since such a preferential arrangement by definition involves less discrimination against nonmembers than a customs union or free-trade area,
47
the justification for proscribing such arrangements absolutely is not clear.
45 See H.G. Johnson, The CriteriaofEconomic Advantage, in WORSWICK, TBE FREE TRADE
PROPOSALS 31 (1960); H.G. Johnson, The Economic Gainsfrom Freer Trade with Europe,
Three Banks Review No. 39, Sept. 1958, p. 3; Scrrovsy, ECONoMac THEORY AND WESTERN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 22-32, 64-70, 112 (1958). But see Gehrels & Johnson, The Economic Gains of European Integration, 63 J. POL. ECON. 275 (1955); see generally BALASSA,
op. cit. supra note 25, at 120-43.
46 It is also possible that creation of a customs union may have certain favorable dynamic
long-term consequences on the rate of growth within the customs union area which will
tend to be favorable from the viewpoint of the world as a whole. Among these consequences
are improvement in internal efficiency of local firms and the breaking up of local monopolies and private controls through the stimulus of new competition from firms in member countries, and the favorable impact of large markets on technological skills, communication and other so-called external economies. See BALASSA, op. cit supra note 25, at 144-88;
see also ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcONoMics 138-322 (8th ed. 1925); Stigler, The

Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185 (1951). No
doubt there are many favorable influences of these kinds but they are hard to measure in
advance. See H.G. JOHNsON, op. cit. supra note 25, at 59-62. Where the proponents of a
customs union are able to demonstrate with a fair degree of certainty that these consequences are to be expected, the Contracting Parties might take them into account.
47 An explanation which reveals the characteristic confusion of thought evidenced
toward preferential arrangements is that advanced by a United States Department of State
official who played a major role in shaping United States commercial policy during the
late 1940's, and in drafting the General Agreement itself: "A customs union creates a wider
trading area, removes obstacles to competition, makes possible a more economic allocation
of resources and thus operates to increase production and raise planes of living. A preferential system, on the other hand, retains internal barriers, obstructs economy in production,
and restrains the growth of income and demand. It is set for the purpose of conferring a
privilege on producers within the system and imposing a handicap on external competitors.
A customs union is conducive to the expansion of trade on a basis of multilateralism and
non-discrimination; a preferential system is not." WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 21, at 70-71.
It is revealing to examine this instance of what may perhaps best be called a nonargument
(i.e., something which looks like an argument but is not in fact an argument) because it is
typical of most discussions of preferential agreements. The first two sentences are simply a
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Certainly it is strange to state, as article XXIV in effect declares, that discrimination is forbidden unless it is one hundred per cent effective.
At least we can say that it is likely that the favorable production effects (displacement of local goods by member goods) of any additional unit of trade
created between members of a free-trade area are likely to be greater when
tariffs are high, as during the first percentage reductions, than when tariffs are
low, as during the last few percentage reductions. Any unit of new trade in the
former case will be created where prices to local producers are much higher
than prices to member producers; here again differences in prices may be
measured by the tariff. After most of the scheduled tariff reductions have occurred, however, any subsequent unit of new trade will be created where prices
to local producers and prices to member producers are less divergent. In the
former case the displacement of the local producers by member producers involves a much more favorable impact on the efficiency of allocation of world
resources. Unfavorable production effects (displacement of nonmember goods
by member goods) of a given unit of production diverted from nonmember to member producers will be of equal magnitude in impact on allocation of world resources whenever, in the process of tariff reduction, it may
occur because the tariff against nonmember countries remains at the same
height at all times. 48 This analysis suggests that a good portion of the benefits
to the world as a whole to be expected by a free-trade area could be achieved
by a preferential arrangement between the same members. 49
One basic distinction must be recognized in considering the appropriate
treatment of preferential arrangements. There is one enormous practical difference between an arrangement in which, say, all intermember tariffs are reduced to eighty per cent of their former level and one in which intermember
tariffs on eighty per cent of intermember trade are totally eliminated. Quite
aside from the implications from the analysis just undertaken that favorable
production effects will be greater in the former case since early reductions tend
to be more beneficial than later reductions, members of a free-trade area are
most likely to exclude from the scope of the arrangements those industries
statement of the alleged differences between customs unions and preferential arrangements.
The purpose attributed to preferential arrangements in the third sentence may be attributed
with at least as much justice to customs unions. The fourth sentence is simply the author's

conclusion.
48 Where a customs union rather than a free-trade area is involved, the situation is much
more complicated since the creation of the common external tariff will alter tariffs against
nonmember countries. In making any final judgment concerning a customs union with
preferential reduction rather than elimination of internal tariffs, one would have to consider

the impact of the creation of the common external tariff.
49 It may be, however, that in the case of any given free-trade area, fewer units of trade
will be created, and more units diverted, by the first reductions than by the last reductions.
We cannot, therefore, conclude that the first tariff reductions must necessarily be more valuable than the later reductions but can only observe that they are more likely to be more
valuable.
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where elimination of intermember tariffs could be expected to have the most
favorable production effects. If an economically significant and politically
sensitive industry is much less efficient in one of the member countries than in
other members and has therefore received a large measure of tariff and quota
protection, it can be expected that strong domestic pressure will be exerted on
that member's government to exclude the industry in question from the scope
of the free-trade area.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the General Agreement's treatment of
preferential arrangements tends to have a perverse impact on allocation of
world resources. Since it requires complete elimination of tariffs only on "substantially all" commodities (and eighty per cent has been suggested as the appropriate measure of "substantially all") but proscribes agreements to reduce
all tariffs to, say, eighty per cent of their former level, article XXIV tends to
encourage precisely those deviations from the perfect free-trade area model
which would minimize favorable production effects. The conclusion would
seem to be that preferential arrangements, rather than being absolutely proscribed, should be subjected to the same kinds of analysis as free-trade areas
and customs unions.
IV.
Having examined the standards enunciated in article XXIV and assessed
the validity of the rationale underlying those standards, it would be appropriate to review the history of the application of those standards by the Contracting Parties to customs unions and free-trade areas which have come into
existence since the General Agreement became effective.
A. Southern Rhodesia-South Africa
The first customs union proposal to come before the Contracting Parties involved a 1948 interim agreement between Southern Rhodesia and the Union
of South Africa.50 While certain tariffs and other restrictions were immediately abolished and while the agreement contemplated that eventually all duties
and other restrictions on internal trade would be abolished and a common external tariff adopted, the interim agreement did not establish a timetable or
even a final date by which interunion tariffs were to be abolished or a common
external tariff adopted. The procedure for further steps toward completion of
the customs union was left entirely to future agreement.
The interim agreement thus quite clearly violated article XXIV by failing
to "include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union
so It might be said that the first customs union proposal to come before the Contracting
Parties was the abortive French-Italian customs union agreement of 1948. The only issue
dealt with by the Contracting Parties, however, was whether France would be violating the
General Agreement by entering into any customs union agreement with Italy since the latter
was not a Contracting Party. In granting France a waiver limited to this issue, the Contracting Parties were not required to review the customs union arrangement as a whole. See
SEYID Mu Ammm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 257-58.
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...within

a reasonable length of time."51 The parties to the customs union
were able to remedy this defect by undertaking to complete the customs union
within ten years and to submit a "definite" plan and schedule at the end of the
first five years. The two governments further undertook to submit a progress
report to the Contracting Parties during the third year and, in addition, to
submit annual reports. In effect, the two governments were granted the right
to give each other preferential treatment immediately with respect to products
in which they were not highly competitive but to wait for at least five years
before deciding how to handle the products where abolition of tariffs would
create severe competition. Opposition to the interim agreement arose among
the members of the working party appointed to review the interim agreement
on the grounds both that ten years was not a "reasonable time" under article
XXIV and that the interim agreement did not, even in the light of the special
undertaking, provide a more definite indication of the steps to be taken toward
a common external tariff. Nonetheless, the Working Party voted to approve
the interim agreement as modified by the representations of the two governments and the Contracting Parties subsequently issued a "declaration" that
the two governments were "entitled to claim the benefits" of article XXIV.52
To evaluate the application of article XXIV to the interim agreement is not
an easy task. Certainly Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were able to
secure approval of an agreement which did not even approach the standards
set forth in article XXIV. They were permitted, in effect, to defer for a fiveyear period the hard work of reaching even a general decision concerning
completion of a full customs union.5 3 Not only was the GATT review something of a capitulation on the legalistic level, but also there does not appear to
have been any consideration of the fundamental underlying question whether
the proposed arrangement was a movement toward or away from free trade.
On the other hand, the Contracting Parties were able to induce the members
of the customs union to agree to make themselves accountable year by year
51 Art. XXIV, para. 5(c).
52 The Declaration, which might more properly have been denominated a waiver of the
requirements of article XXIV, is interesting in its choice of qualifying words. Thus, the
Declaration was made "taking note" of the two governments' undertakings and subject to a
"request" that the annual report include a "definite plan and schedule" of the steps to be
taken within each succeeding twelve-month period. The Contracting Parties reserved the
right to review the Declaration if they should find that the interim agreement was not likely
to result in the establishment of a customs union by the end of the ten-year period.
53 Subsequent developments concerning the Southern Rhodesian-South African agreements were even more dismaying for the integrity of article XXIV. At the end of the first
five years, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which had succeeded to the rights
and obligations of Southern Rhodesia) and South Africa were unable to reach the definite
agreement contemplated by the earlier Declaration. The Contracting Parties gave them another year's grace. GATT, BAsic INsTmuMENTs, 3d Supp., at 47 (1954), and when the Federation thereupon entered into a new trade agreement with South Africa, the Contracting
Parties recognized a permanent preferential trading agreement between the two customs
territories. See id., 4th Supp., at 17, 72 (1955); 9th Supp., at 51, 231 (1960).
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for progress in the implementation of their plans. This concession by Southem Rhodesia and South Africa constituted a recognition that the world-wide
impact of customs unions makes their creation and implementation of common concern to all Contracting Parties. This principle, thus established quite
early in the application of article XXIV, was to prove to be of no small importance to later customs unions.
B. El Salvador-Nicaragua
In 1951 El Salvador and Nicaragua agreed to enter into a free-trade area
which did not conform in two respects, one technical and the other of considerable substance, with article XXIV. The former was that El Salvador was
not a member of GATT, a circumstance raising difficulties under the language
of paragraph 5 permitting free-trade areas "between the territories of contracting parties." The difficulty of greater substantive import was that the
treaty permitted the imposition of quantitative restrictions on intermember
trade under certain circumstances.S 4 The Contracting Parties granted a waiver
under the two-thirds majority provisions of paragraph 10 of article XXIV on
the understanding that Nicaragua, the GATT member, would limit the exercise of its power to impose quantitative restrictions in a manner consistent
with the general conception of a free-trade area under paragraph 8(a) and
would submit annual reports on progress particularly concerning quantitative restrictions.55 The Contracting Parties reserved the right to review their
decision if they should find, either from the information submitted by Nicaragua or from other sources, that the treaty "is not resulting in the maintenance of a free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV."56 Thus, while the two
governments were permitted to impose certain quantitative restrictions, the
extent of those restrictions remained a question on which the members of
GATT might require multilateral consultation. Thus, the precedent of the
Southern Rhodesian-South African customs union was used to insure future
consultation concerning the impact of the El Salvador-Nicaragua free-trade
area on nonmember countries. It does not appear from the published report,
however, that any attention was given to the question whether the free-trade
area was a movement toward or away from free trade.
54 See SEYID MUHAMMAD, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK or WORLD TRADE 250 (1958).
55
The ambiguous phrasing of the Decision of 25 October 1951, 2 GATT, BASIC INSTRU-

MENrs 30 ("Taking further notice of the intention of the Government of Nicaragua that its
action under the Treaty and specifically under Articles III and IV thereof will be limited to
those consistent with the objective of maintaining a free-trade area as defined in Article
XXIV, paragraph 8(b) of the General Agreement") was probably intended to suggest that
quantitative restrictions might be approved on some but not most trade between the two
countries.
56 Ibid. It is not clear why the El Salvador-Nicaragua free-trade area was granted a
waiver whereas the Southern Rhodesia-South Africa customs union was declared to be entitled to claim the benefits of article XXIV. The difference would appear only to be one of

form.
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C. European Coaland Steel Community
In two quite different ways the formation in 1952 of the European Coal and
Steel Community was a decisive test of the role to be played by GATT in
supervising the creation of regional economic organizations. First, the structure of this organization departed so sharply from the form envisaged in
article XXIV that it was impossible to pretend that the requirements of that
article were met. Second, the role of GATT as a forum for a continuing dialogue between regional economic organizations and interested foreign governments, rather than as a juridical body passing a once-for-all judgment on the
conformity of the regional treaty with the General Agreement, became generally accepted not only as the preferable role, but also as perhaps the only
effective role, which GATT as an international organization could play.
For several reasons ECSC was not a customs union or free-trade area within
the meaning of article XXIV. It covered only coal and steel, clearly not "subtantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating" within the ECSC member countries under article XXIV (8)(a)(i). The
Community was, it will be recalled, a major experiment in "functional" integration, a type of regional organization largely unforeseen at the drafting of
the General Agreement. 57 Second, aside from the limited number of products
involved, the ECSC was a hybrid between a customs union and a free-trade
area. It therefore did not provide for a common external tariff but neither did
it leave its members free, within the limitations of their general commitments
under GATT, to pursue independent external commercial policies.5 8 Only a
"harmonized" tariff was foreseen, a concept of uncertain content for some
time after the entry into force of the ECSC treaty. 59 Even if these two differences could be overlooked on the ground that the ECSC was a novel organizational form serving the same objectives as traditional customs unions and
free-trade areas, certain specific provisions of the ECSC treaty were difficult
to square either with article XXIV in particular or the General Agreement as a
whole. Italy, as a high-cost producer, was to retain its barriers against other
ECSC members well beyond the time other internal barriers were to be abolished. The Benelux countries reserved the right to increase certain duties, in
order to facilitate harmonization of ECSC external tariffs, without extending
compensation to other Contracting Parties as required by the General Agree57 See MORGENTHAU, PoLmcs AMONG NATIONS 498 (2d ed. 1954).
58

See MEADE, LiESNER, & WELLS, CASE STUDIEs iN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION 408-09

(1962).

59
Under article 71 the member states were granted autonomy over commercial policy
toward nonmember states, subject to certain limitations. With respect to tariffs, the Council
was given the power under article 72 to establish, by unanimous vote on proposal by the
High Authority, maximum and minimum rates of duty. The High Authority was given
supervisory power over member-state import and export licensing programs and, to a
limited extent, power to impose or require quantitative and other restrictions. See arts. 58, 73
and 74. See LisrR, EURoPE's COAL AND STEEL CoMMUNry 339-43 (1960).
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ment. Belgium reserved the right to maintain for seven years quantitative restrictions on coal in order to protect its inefficient collieries. 60
Despite these grave departures from the terms of article XXIV, support for
a waiver was almost unanimous among the Contracting Parties. 6' Whether
this widespread support stemmed from political support for the Six, from
faith in the economic promise of the ECSC experiment, or from a lack of
confidence in the power of GATT to prevent establishment of the Community
is unclear, although all three factors probably played a role.62 This general
support did not prevent those countries which feared the consequences of the
new Community for their own economies from grasping the opportunity to
exact concessions from the members of the ECSC. The proceedings of the
Working Party provided a convenient negotiating forum. In the end the Six
made certain major, if ambiguously stated, concessions. As set forth in the preamble of the Decision of the Contracting Parties granting the waiver, the Six
agreed (1) "to take account of the interests of third countries both as consumers and as suppliers of coal and steel products, to further the development
of international trade, and to ensure that equitable prices are charged by its
producers in markets outside the Community," a commitment in substance
to avoid serious disturbance to traditional markets and sources of supply; (2)
"to harmonize their customs duties and other trade regulations... upon a
basis which shall be lower and less restrictive than the general incidence of
the duties and regulations of commerce now applicable," a somewhat more
rigorous standard than the "not on the whole... higher or more restrictive"
standard set forth in article XXIV; and (3) "to avoid placing unreasonable
barriers upon exports to third countries, including, specifically, unreasonable
duties and unreasonable quantitative restrictions," 63 a commitment to take account of the interests of third countries which were dependent on Community
sources for raw materials in the event that shortages within the Community
led to export quotas.
60
There were other conflicts between the ECSC treaty and the General Agreement. See
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, Ist Supp., at 17-19 (1952).

61Only Czechoslovakia opposed a waiver.
62 The Report of the Working Party may be found in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, 1st

Supp., at 85 (1952), and the Decision of the Contracting Parties, id. at 17. It is perhaps revealing that the waiver finally granted by the Contracting Parties was not a waiver under

paragraph 10 of article XXIV of the provisions of that article, such as had been granted the
El Salvador-Nicaragua free-trade area, but rather a general waiver under article XXV from
the provisions of the unconditional most-favored-nation provision of article I. Article XXV,
paragraph 5, provides: "In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this
Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting

party by this Agreement ....

A two-thirds majority of votes cast, comprising not less than

half of the Contracting Parties, is required.

The manner in which the Working Party proceeded is candidly revealed by the statement in its Report that "having agreed on the desirability" of the waiver, the Working
Party "considered the principles on the basis of which a waiver should be granted." GAIT,
BAsIC INSTRUMENTS, 1st Supp., at 87 (1952).
63 Id. at 18.
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The indefiniteness of these commitments required establishment of some
reviewing mechanism to assure that they were not subsequently ignored by the
Six. While the ECSC Convention was not in form an interim agreement, although a transitional period was contemplated, the policies previously
adopted with respect to interim agreements provided a convenient precedent.
The Working Party "agreed that, on the analogy of the procedure adopted
with respect to interim agreements ... it would be appropriate for the governments of the member States (of The Community) to submit an annual report
...until the end of the transitional period ... "64 Thus was established a
framework for annual discussions between the Community and the Contracting Parties concerning not only compliance with specific undertakings but also
the continuing economic impact of the Community on third countries generally.
The implications of this annual review were not at first fully understood
by the High Authority. Upon submission of the first annual report of the
Community, the Working Party demanded additional information with respect to such specific matters as export prices, cartel arrangements, export
quotas and the High Authority's intentions concerning future commercial
policy. During the discussions of the Working Party, the external policies of
the Community were subjected to detailed and critical review.
Disagreement was the keynote of the six week series of meetings of the
Working Party at the second annual review. The Report of the Working
Party reviewed extensive criticisms of Community policy made by various
countries as well as the High Authority's reply. At the conclusion of the Report, the Working Party reiterated its view that "the waiver states in a most
unequivocal manner that the waiver was granted in consideration of the...
definite assurances given by the High Authority and the Member States regarding their intentions to pursue constructive trade policies towards outside
countries" and stated the views of various third countries that progress had
not been sufficiently rapid. The Report further suggested that certain countries found the information supplied by the ECSC inadequate. The attitude of
the High Authority toward these third-country criticisms and demands, as re65
vealed in a subsequent public report, was highly skeptical.
The third review went much better. The High Authority provided more
64 Id. at 89. (Emphasis added.) For the decision by the Contracting Parties to require
such an annual report, see id. at 21.
65 "[Clertain third countries clearly intimated that by granting the waiver, they considered
they had a right to supervise all undertakings entered into by the member States or the High
Authority under the Treaty. The delegates of the Community expressed themselves as
alarmed by such an interpretation.... They added that various assurances had been given
to the Contracting Parties, including the undertaking to provide it with information on the
activities of the Community, but that it was definitely understood that such information was
not always suitable for discussion before the Contracting Parties." HIGH AuTHoarr,
TuaD GEN. REP. ON THE AcTivirIES OF THE CommuNry 33-34 (1955).
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definite information, thus diverting third-country grievances concerning
prices from generalized unverifiable charges to more expert technical inquiries
into the difficult economic problems faced by the Community. The additional
information, according to the High Authority, "was much appreciated, and
the atmosphere in which the discussions took place... was distinctly more
encouraging than in previous years.6 6 From this third review in 1955 through
the review of the High Authority's final report at the conclusion of the transitional period in 1958, the tone of meetings became more technical and less political. The quality and extent of information supplied by the High Authority
improved and the High Authority was no longer viewed, either by itself or by
third countries, as "the defendant in the dock."67
The influence of the GATT reviews on the policies of the High Authority
was undoubtedly beneficial to affected third countries. To take an example,
Austria, a country whose steel production seemed likely to be displaced in
Community markets by higher-cost Community producers, won important
concessions. 68 As William Diebold concluded in his comprehensive study,
The Schuman Plan, the GATT reviews proved to be the most effective outside
pressure faced by the High Authority, preventing it from subordinating, out
of expedience, external considerations to more urgent and direct internal
pressures. 69
D. European Economic Community
The six countries which formed The European Coal and Steel Community
extended the scope of their integration to the rest of the economy through
formation of the European Economic Community.70 The Treaty of Rome,
signed in March, 1957, provided not only for elimination of intermember
trade barriers and establishment of a common external commercial policy but
also for elimination of restrictions on movement of capital and labor and for
coordination of certain internal economic policies. While the EEC thus went
66

HIGH AuTHORrry, FOURTH GEN. REP. ON THE AcnvrrEs OF THE COmMUNnTy, 34-35

(1956); see MEADE, op. cit. supra note 58, at 412.
67

DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN, 525-32 (1959); MEADE, op. cit. supra note 58, at 41112; cf. CAMS, TRADE POLICY AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 15 (1957).

68 In the course of certain multilateral negotiations within the framework of GATT,
Austria received concessions on exports to the Community valued at approximately $15
million while making concessions on imports from the Community valued at approximately
$2 million. See DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra note 67, at 476 n.6.
69 DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra note 67, at 531-32; see Vernon, Economic Aspects of the
Atlantic Community, in HAVILAND, THE UNrrED STATES AND THE WESTERN CoMMUNrrY

53 (1957). Diebold also suggests that the High Authority itself profited; its international

personality was enhanced by its negotiations with the Working Party and its commitment
concerning export prices was useful in its conflict with the Community steel export cartel.
DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra at 630-31.

70 A separate organization, the European Atomic Energy Community was established,
to create a common market for nuclear products. See Report of the GATT Working Party,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS, 6th Supp., at 109 (1957).
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far beyond traditional free-trade area and customs unions projects, it nonetheless had to pass muster under article XXIV.
The Treaty of Rome was submitted in the first instance to a committee of
the whole which in turn established four "Sub-Groups" to examine each of
the four most troubling problems raised by the treaty: The common external
tariff, quantitative restrictions, agriculture and the association of overseas
territories.71
1. Sub-GroupA: The Common ExternalTariff. The primary concern of the
first Sub-Group was the "height" of the common external tariff. For the first
time in the GATT reviews under article XXIV, the ambiguities inherent in the
provisions of article XXIV governing the permissible height of customs
unions' common external tariffs had to be squarely faced. At the outset there
was a disagreement between EEC members and other Contracting Parties
concerning the relationship between paragraphs 4 and 5 of that article. Was
the basic test to be the general test of paragraph 4, which declared that the
"purpose" of a customs union "should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting
parties with such territories"? Or was the governing standard to be the more
technical criterion of paragraph 5, that the common "duties and other regulations of commerce" were not to be "on the whole higher or more restrictive
than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union"?
Or were the two paragraphs to be read together, and if so, how?
Most members of Sub-Group A argued that paragraph 4 enunciated the
general principles, although any questions concerning the application of paragraph 5 were to be resolved in the light of paragraph 4. 7 2 Some members of
the Sub-Group went further, asserting that paragraph 4 was controlling. The
EEC members argued that paragraph 4 merely stated a general goal and paragraph 5 was intended-as the initial word "accordingly" indicated-to set
forth the tests under which it could be determined whether the customs union
did in fact have the general purpose set forth in praragraph 4. Under this
view, if the tests of paragraph 5 were met, it could not be argued that a separate hurdle in paragraph 4 must also be cleared. No formal decision was
reached, but the EEC members were successful in shifting the attention of the
Sub-Group to the technical criteria of paragraph 5.
The implications of this shift were far-reaching. Legality became essentially
a statistical question. The more general, and more relevant, question whether
the EEC constituted a movement toward or away from world trade was not
considered. The EEC members were thus able to avoid the product-by71 Their reports are contained id. at 70-109.
72 Id. at 71.
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product and the country-by-country studies sought by some members of the
Sub-Group.73
The materials submitted to the Sub-Group concerning the common external tariff were not adequate for any final judgment on the compatibility of
the Treaty of Rome with article XXIV. In some cases the rates announced
were only maximum "ceiling" rates and the final duties might be much lower.
In other cases, particularly the products on "List G" with respect to which no
agreement had yet been reached between the Six, no figures were available.
Nevertheless, to the extent that final rates proposed had been calculated by
taking an arithmetical average of the individual duties of the Six, 74 a substantial issue of compatibility with article XXIV was presented. The Six were
not prepared to discuss the best method of calculation because, in their view,
75
paragraph 5 did not require any special method.
The intransigence of the Six against product-by-product or country-bycountry studies and in favor of the arithmetic-average method, coupled with
the absence of agreement among them on many duties in the common external
tariff, led to postponement of resolution of the legal issues. 76 The Six were unwilling even to agree to a definite date by which they would be able to supply a
completed schedule of the common external tariff, a not unreasonable attitude
in view of the possible internal complications ahead for the Six in reaching
agreement among themselves. 77
73 It does not appear to have been strenuously argued by any of the members of the SubGroup that the items in the common external tariff schedule were to be examined individually in order to determine whether each duty was "on the whole higher or more restrictive"
than the corresponding duties of the six members, although under such a view a productby-product study would have been appropriate. See discussion at pp. 618-19 supra.
74
Since Benelux was already a customs territory, it was counted as one of the four constituent units of the EEC in calculating the external tariff.
75 Indeed, the Six argued that they had gone beyond the requirements of paragraph 5 by
using in their calculations the actual rates in effect on January 1, 1957, rather than the maximum authorized or "legal" rates, despite the fact that some legal rates had then been under
temporary suspension. Moreover, for a number of products arbitrary ceiling rates had been
established which would be applied even though an arithmetic average would produce a
higher rate. GATT, BASIC INsTmuINTs, 6th Supp., at 72 (1957).
76 Under Article 20 and List G of the Treaty of Rome, the rates of duty for products encompassing some 20% of total imports of the Community were left for future agreement.
Since these products tended to be those on which there was the sharpest conflict of interest
among Community members concerning the appropriate rate of duty, it was quite difficult
to determine at the time of the GATT review the overall "height" of the future common
external tariff. See Ouin, The Establishment of the Customs Union, in 1 STEIN & NICHOLSON,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 101, 137-39 (1960).

77 The only question on which the Sub-Group could reach agreement was the necessity
of negotiations within the general GATT framework with respect to compensation for the
duties, notably those of Benelux, which would necessarily be increased in arriving at a
common external tariff. But even here the Six were unwilling to make any commitments
until consultations had been held concerning the significance of the provision of paragraph
6 to the effect that "due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by
the reductions brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the
union." GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, 6th Supp., at 74 (1957).
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2. Sub-Group B: QuantitativeRestrictions. As part of the systematic elimination of internal trade barriers envisaged by the Treaty of Rome, each member was required to eliminate quantitative restrictions against other members. 78 Balance-of-payments difficulties were not to serve, with certain limited
exceptions, as justification for such restrictions. While the provisions for
elimination of internal quantitative restrictions thus tended to parallel the
provisions for elimination of internal tariffs, the treatment of quantitative restrictions against nonmembers differed greatly from the treatment of external
tariffs. Unlike the agreement to create a common external tariff, the Six merely agreed to aim, during the transition period, "at securing uniformity between
themselves at as high a level as possible" and to follow, after the transition
period, a "common commercial policy" based on "uniform principles" concerning "alignment of measures of liberalization." 79
Two consequences followed from this differential pattern. The first was
that under the Rome Treaty, an EEC member might eliminate quantitative
restrictions against members while retaining restrictions against nonmembers.
While a pattern of discrimination distasteful to nonmember countries was thus
created, it was not essentially different from that to be created by the corresponding elimination of internal tariffs. In the view of the Six at least, the
same rules applicable to tariffs would be applicable to quantitative restrictions
imposed by the EEC-that is, EEC common quotas "must not on the whole
be more restrictive than those... which they would have been able to apply
if the union had not been established."80 The second consequence was that
the Community might require a member either to impose a quota, or to participate in a Community-wide quota, in order to protect the balance-ofpayments position of another member. An exceedingly abstruse wrangle developed over whether such restrictions did not fall outside the balance-ofpayments exception of article XII to the general prohibition against quantitative restrictions contained in article XI.L81
78 Treaty of Rome, arts. 30-37, 104-09 (1957).
79 Id., arts. 111, 113.
80 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, 6th Supp., at 77 (1957).
81Article XII, since it did not refer specifically to customs unions, was quite understand-

ably phrased in terms of the balance of payments of the contracting party imposing the
quota, not the balance of payments of some other contracting party. Thus, it could be
argued that the Treaty of Rome permitted an EEC member to impose quantitative restrictions under circumstances not permitted by articles XI and XII. Since the essence of a customs union-as opposed to a free-trade area-is a common external commercial policy, the
Six were on strong ground when they insisted that the customs union could not be perfected
if a common policy on quotas was not permitted. In any event, since article XXIV, paragraph 5 explicitly provided that the "provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent...
the formation of a customs union" (assuming the requirements of article XXIV are met),
surely the members of the customs union should be exempted from the quantitative restriction prohibition of article XI of the General Agreement in the same way in which they were
exempted from the most-favored-nation obligation of article I. The opposing position was
that until such time as the Six held their foreign exchange reserves in common, a situation
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While the Six could not argue away the legal objections, they sought to

quiet third-country fears by holding out the prospect that, balance-of-payments conditions permitting, the EEC would reduce quotas against nonmembers at the same time, though perhaps not so quickly, as the dismantling

within the EEC.82
The deliberations of the Working Party were largely unsatisfactory. A
good deal of energy was expended in parsing the various provisions of the
Treaty of Rome and the General Agreement. No resolution of the legal issues
proved possible.83 Nor was any attention paid to the allocation-of-resources

implications of discrimination between members and nonmembers in the
quantitative restrictions. As we have seen, elimination of quantitative restricnot explicitly contemplated by the EEC treaty though no doubt held as a long-term goal by
enthusiasts for European integration, Community-wide quotas and common quota policies
could not be countenanced. The effect of imposing quotas against nonmembers without also
imposing quotas against members would be that "imports would tend to flow to the country not in a position to finance them at the expense of the other Members [of the EEC] who
had no difficulty in financing them." GATT, BASIC INsmmuEN-rs, 6th Supp., at 79 (1957).
82 The Six observed that a similar reduction of quantitative restrictions within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation had been required by the OEEC's Code of
Liberalization. At the same time that the seventeen OEEC members reduced quantitative
restrictions against one another, they also reduced such restrictions, albeit at a slower pace,
against nonmembers. While the GATT had never explicitly reviewed the Code of Liberalization, most GATT members had not protested the resulting discrimination, both because it
had some justification in balance-of-payments considerations (the OEEC members having
facilities for clearing balances among themselves on a multilateral basis through the European Payments Union while being forced to clear balances with nonmembers on a bilateral
basis) and because the Code was felt to be a move in the right general direction which should
not be discouraged by legal considerations. See GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTs, 6th Supp., at 80
(1957); id., 3d Supp., at 178-79 (1954); FRANK, THE EUROPEAN CoMMON MARKET 44-71,
245-46 (1961).
83 The debates became extremely technical. On the one hand, it was argued by certain
nonmembers that article XXIV did not contemplate a common external quota policy.
Despite the reference by the Six to paragraph 8 (ii), which made it an element of the definition of a customs union that "substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce [be] are applied by each of the members.., to the trade of [nonmembers]," application of the term "other regulations of commerce" was properly to be limited, it was argued,
to such routine matters as grading and marketing requirements. That the term should not
be read so narrowly, argued the Six, was clear from the fact that the corresponding provision of paragraph 5(a) ("duties and other regulations of commerce ... shall not on the
whole be higher or more restrictive....") clearly contemplated that "regulations of commerce" could be "restrictive."
The nonmembers argued, however, that paragraph 8(a)(i) indicated the proper construction of the term "regulation of commerce." It was there provided that one element of a customs union was that "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XI, XII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated"
with respect to internal trade. Not only did paragraph 8(a)(i) indicate that the draftsmen
used the adjective "restrictive" to modify "regulations of commerce" when they wished to
refer to quantitative restrictions but also that since paragraph 8(a)(i) specifically permitted
the members of a customs union to impose quantitative restrictions against each other for
balance-of-payments purposes, nothing in article XXIV required customs union members to
discriminate against nonmembers in the imposition of quantitative restrictions.
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tions among members is much more likely to have favorable effects than elimi84
nation of tariffs.
3. Sub-Group C: Agriculture. The agricultural provisions of the Rome
Treaty presented serious problems of a peculiar nature.8 5 In the first place, although agricultural commodities were subject to GATT rules in precisely the
same manner as other commodities, overproduction and protectionism were
the rule throughout most of the temperate world. In some cases GATT rules
were directly flouted and in other cases various types of internal taxes or other
devices were used to interrupt the free flow of agricultural commodities. 86
Furthermore, the Six, united in believing that even within the Community
unrestricted free trade in agricultural commodities was impracticable, but unable to agree on definite policies for common administration of the agricultural sector, had included in the Treaty of Rome only very general provisions
which contemplated more precise agreement at a later date. A "common agricultural policy" was to be adopted.87 This common policy was to be implemented through a "common organization of agricultural markets" 8 8 which
might utilize such techniques as price controls, subsidies, stockpiling and
"common machinery for stabilizing importation or exportation." 89 During
the transition period, each of the Member States was permitted to establish a
system of minimum prices below which imports could be temporarily suspended or reduced.90 In addition, until a common organization superseded
the national agricultural organizations for a given commodity, EEC members
might under certain circumstances carry on trade through long-term bilateral
contracts. 91 The powers granted the Community with respect to the common
organization and to the member states with respect to minimum prices and
long term contracts were hedged about with a number of troublesome conditions. These conditions, while not specifically requiring new barriers to imports into the Community, nevertheless were phrased in a manner which suggested that new import restrictions might be imposed.
Agricultural exporting countries outside the EEC, concerned that their exports to the Community might be reduced, argued that the establishment of
the common organization and of the transitional arrangements for minimum
prices and long term contracts, were likely to be inconsistent with the admonition of paragraph 4 of article XXIV that the "purpose of a customs
union ... should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and
not to raise barriers to trade of other contracting parties with such territories."
8

4 See discussion at pp. 625-26 supra.
Treaty of Rome, arts. 38-47 (1957).

85

86 As the Executive Secretary of GATT has crisply summarized, "The legal situation.. •
bears no relation to the facts." E.W. WHirE, THE FiRsT TEN YEARs OF TaE GATT 11 (1958).

87 Treaty of Rome, art. 38, para. 4 (1957).
88 Id., art. 40, para. 2.
89 Id., art. 40, para. 3.

9old., art. 44.
91 Id., art. 45.
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Whatever might occur in the course of the implementation of the agricultural provisions of the Treaty of Rome, it was difficult to show that the treaty
itself violated article XXIV. The very generality of the EEC agricultural provisions and their permissive, rather than mandatory, character made clear
that neither the EEC Commission nor the member states were required to
take action which would violate GATT rules. In the view of the Six, if such
action was taken in the future, there would then be an appropriate occasion
to consider the legal questions. The upshot was that, although a majority of
the members of the Sub-Group held the view that the agricultural provisions
"carried a strong presumption of increased external barriers and a substitution of new internal barriers in place of existing tariffs and other measures,"
the majority decided that it was then impossible to determine the compatibility with the General Agreement of either the agricultural provisions or their
future implementation. The majority sought to induce the Six to establish liaison machinery with the Contracting Parties concerning the implementation of the agricultural provisions but the Six refused, arguing that they
should not be required to provide any information not required of other Contracting Parties. The discussions in Sub-Group C thus reached a total impasse.
4. Sub-Group D: The Association Overseas Territories. France, Belgium
and the Netherlands came to the Rome Treaty negotiations with a series of
preferential commercial arrangements with certain present and former
colonies.92 The General Agreement, while permitting continuation of these
preferences, specifically prohibited any increase in the "margin of prefer93
ence."
It was generally conceded during the negotiations leading up to the Rome
Treaty that special arrangements had to be made for these territories. As the
result of hard bargaining by France, the member with by far the most extensive relations with these territories, the arrangements made were quite lavish.
As "associated overseas territories" they were to receive the benefits of the
progressive dismantling of intra-EEC barriers only to a limited extent. While
the general rule was that the territories were to reduce import duties 94 at the
same rate as the Six, they were permitted to maintain, and indeed to levy new,
protective tariffs for economic development purposes and revenue tariffs for
budgetary purposes, provided they proceeded systematically to eliminate any
differentials in rates among members of the Community.9 5
92 Italy also had a special relationship with the Territory of Somaliland. These arrange-

ments were exempt from the most-favored-nation clause of the General Agreement either
because they were specifically exempted in the General Agreement, or because they were
between territories which were under common sovereignty on July 1, 1939. GAIT, art. I,
para. 2.
93 The margin of preference is, in general, the difference as of April 10, 1947, between
the preferential rate and the most-favored-nation rate. GATT, art. I, para. 4.
94 The associated territories were not required to reduce export duties, a circumstance
that produced some minor difficulties during the review by the Working Party.
95
Treaty of Rome, art. 133, para. 3 (1957). For a detailed consideration of the overseas
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Many contracting parties, particularly those exporting tropical products,
were alarmed at the advantageous position granted the associated territories.
These associated territories were to have tariff-free, quota-free access not only
to France (or Belgium or the Netherlands, as the case may have been), but to
the entire EEC market; at the same time, competing exporting nations, which
formerly had sold to the remaining five EEC members on equal terms with
the associated territories were to continue to face the old barriers and in some
cases, as the common external tariff was adopted, even higher tariffs.9 6 Since
the nonmember contracting parties were more concerned with the impending
injury to their own exports than with the allocation of world resources, they
failed to make clearly the rather obvious point that since most of the associated territories' exports to the Six were tropical products not produced in the
EEC itself, production effects were to that extent almost certainly negative.
Local production in the EEC would not be hampered by competition from
the associated territories, but substantial nonmember production was certain
to be displaced.
When the EEC sought to justify the association arrangement as a freetrade area under paragraph 8(b) of article XXIV, many contracting parties
were understandably hostile. The arrangement had neither been conceived as,
nor denominated in the Rome Treaty as, a free-trade area and the EEC arguments seemed a legalistic afterthought. To many members of Sub-Group D,
the arrangement was simply an extension of an existing preferential commercial arrangement and thereby a violation of the most-favored-nation clause
of article I. Many of the arguments advanced against the arrangement were of
dubious validity. 97 But the provisions granting the associated territories the
right to retain tariffs (and indeed to impose new tariffs) against the Six appeared to conflict with the requirement of the General Agreement that tariffs
be eliminated on "substantially all the trade between constituent territories."
Since trade between the territories and the Six was minute compared to trade
among the Six, the EEC representative was able to advance statistics showing
that only 1.4 per cent of the total trade between the territories of the free-trade
areas as a whole (the Six plus the overseas territories) was potentially subject
territories provisions, see Hay, The Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories,
in 2 STEIN & NICHOLSON, op. cit. supra note 76, at 647.
96 The associated territories arrangements had only a five year term and, since each member state was required to reduce tariffs and other barriers against the overseas territories
only as fast as against other member states, the association arrangement would expire before all barriers had been eliminated against imports from overseas territories. But it was
contemplated that the overseas territories arrangement would be renewed and thus at the
end of the transition period, all barriers would be eliminated against imports from overseas
territories.
97 Examples of the less convincing arguments against the association arrangement were
that article XXIV neither permitted a contracting party to be simultaneously a member of
a customs union and of a free-trade area, nor permitted a free-trade area between industrialized and raw materials exporting countries.
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to protective duties. Such a small percentage, it was argued, surely did not
violate the "substantially all" criterion. A spirited debate followed with the
nonmembers suggesting various comparisons which they considered more appropriate and the Six retorting that they could not be expected to furnish
further statistics until agreement was reached on a definition of the "substantially all" criterion.
While the Six were as unbending on the legal issues as in the other SubGroups, 98 they did consent to a product-by-product study to determine the
effects of association on other contracting parties. They stipulated, however,
that such a study could not impose on them any obligations beyond the
specific requirements of the General Agreement.
5. Further Considerationof the Treaty of Rome.
(a) The Commodity Study. The agreement by the Six to a commodity-bycommodity study of the impact of the overseas territories provisions upon
third countries was a major break through in the direction of informed consultation. For the first time in the review of the Treaty of Rome, the discussion was brought down from lofty legalistic peaks to an expert, technical
study of the concrete effects to be expected of the arrangements created by the
treaty.99
The results of the study itself, however, were somewhat disappointing.
First, of course, the study was necessarily limited by its terms of reference to
a study of the effects of the overseas territories provisions and thus made no
attempt to assess the effects of the Community as a whole. Second, only
products imported from the overseas territories to the Six were studied; no
attention was directed to exports from the Six to the overseas territories or
trade among overseas territories. Third, only twelve commodities were
studied,OO and although these commodities constituted a very large percentage of total EEC imports from the overseas territories, it was not possible to
say that even the total import situation had been reviewed. Fourth, the Six
could not reach agreement with the majority of the Working Partyl01 on the
98 The debate became extraordinarily legalistic. For example, it was observed by certain
nonmembers that article XXIV, paragraph 8(a)(i), did not include within the explicit exceptions to the "substantially all" requirement tariffs imposed for economic development purposes under article XVIII. The Six countered with the argument that paragraph 8(a)(i) also
failed to mention article XXI but surely the General Agreement did not foreclose members
of a free-trade area from imposing security restrictions (on fissionable materials, arms, ammunition, etc.) pursuant to that article. GATT, BASIC INSmTMENrs, 6th Supp., at 97 (1957).

99 For the text of the studies together with general conclusions of the Working Party, see
GATT, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON THE ASSOCIATION OF OVERSEAs TERRITORIES
WITH THE EUROPEAN EcoNoNc CoMMUNITY INCLUDING COMMODITY TRADE STUDIES (Doc.
No. 1805/Rev. 1,Adds. 1-12) (1958).
100 Cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas, sugar, tobacco, oilseeds, cotton, hard fibers, wood,
aluminum and lead.
101 Only two members of the EEC were members of the Working Party: France and the
Netherlands. Except for the United States and Greece, which apparently remained neutral

throughout the discussions, the remaining members of the Working Party formed a solid
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relevant principles to be applied in determining the impact of the association
upon world trade in those commodities.
The last of the four limiting aspects of the report is worth more intensive
consideration for the light it throws on the difficulty of assessing the future
impact of a customs union or a free-trade area. The position of most members
of the Working Party was simple and straightforward: The association would
necessarily open to the associated territories a vast barrier-free, protected
market adequate to absorb not only present production but all foreseeable
production by the overseas territories as a whole in each of the twelve commodities. The effect would be, according to this analysis, to permit the associated territories to capture markets presently served by nonassociated
areas; to encourage additional, and thus uneconomic, production in the associated territories with the necessary result of even further diversion of
exports from nonassociated territories; and, given the necessity of third
countries to find markets outside the Six in view of the increased production
in the associated territories, to depress world market prices.102
To the Six, reasoning in this manner was reasoning in a vacuum. Harm to
third countries could not be predicted without a forecast of future trends in
world prices, at least through the transition period. The association would be
only one factor among many determining the level of those prices. One could
not overlook, the Six argued, the influence of rising world consumption which
would accompany rising living standards, the stability of traditional trade
patterns, or the physical, climatic and financial problems affecting production in the overseas territories. More particularly, it would be improper to
ignore the rising level of consumption within the Community itself which,
it was contemplated, would result from the creation of the customs union.
The majority of the Working Party defended on several grounds the procedure of attempting to isolate the influence of the association from all other
influences on prices. Third countries would be entitled to participate in the
fruits of rising consumption throughout the world if there were no Treaty of
Rome. 103 They were, moreover, entitled to participate in the rising consumpfront against the Six on most issues: Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and the United
Kingdom.
102 Although the Six protested that no scientific study had been made of elasticity of demand in the twelve commodities under review, the majority of the Working Party clearly
assumed that demand was inelastic and hence that a small increase in supply on the world
market would seriously depress prices and thus have a drastic effect on national and foreign
exchange earnings of primary producing countries. REPORT OF THE WORKiNG PARTY, op. cit.
supra note 99, at 10.
103 Much of such increased consumption, argued the third countries, was to be expected
in state trading countries, such as the U.S.S.R. The lack of responsiveness of such countries'
purchases to purely commercial factors made participation by third countries in the rising
consumption of such countries uncertain. RFPOtT OF THE WoRKn'O PARTY, op. cit. supra
note 99, at 7,
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tion of the Six stemming from economic integration since the expectation of
such increased consumption was an essential part of the rationale underlying
the customs union and free-trade area exceptions to the most-favored-nation
principle in the General Agreement.
The twelve commodity studies represented the first serious attempt in the
history of the application of article XXIV to reach a multilateral assessment
of the economic impact of a regional grouping on nonmember contracting
parties. A great deal of information was gathered, subjected to expert analysis
and made available to interested countries. Those who have been dismayed at
the failure of many international organizations, such as the United Nations,
to be able even to address themselves to complicated economic problems without endless harangue and diatribe, should note that the Working Party's deliberations were carried on in a restrained atmosphere among experts who,
while representing their respective nations' interests fully, were able to reach
a surprising degree of agreement on difficult questions. The disagreements outlined above reflect primarily differences in standards. Such differences could
be expected to diminish in importance if the discussions were conducted under
standards set forth in a properly drafted article XXIV. The limitations in the
utility of the commodity study were primarily the self-imposed limitations on
its scope. Unless such a study were expanded to include all major commodities, exported to as well as imported from the overseas territories, no comprehensive judgment could be made on the impact of the overseas territories provisions of the Treaty of Rome, even assuming some delineation of standards
was made in a revised article XXIV.
(b) The Thirteenth Session. At their Thirteenth Session in October and
November of 1958, the Contracting Parties had before them not only the reports of the Sub-Groups which had met during the Twelfth Session but also
the commodity-by-commodity report of the Working Party on Overseas
Territories. In view of the absence of conclusions in those reports, no decision
could be reached concerning the legality of the Treaty of Rome under article
XXIV. Acting in the light of the recommendation of the Intersessional Committee that "it would be more fruitful if attention could be directed to specific
and practical problems, leaving aside for the time being questions of law and
4
debates about the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with article XXIV,"0
the Contracting Parties decided that legal questions "could not usefully be
pursued at the present time."' 05 The legal issues were thus deferred indefinitely subject to the right of any Contracting Party to raise those issues where
relevant within the context of other GATT procedures.
The legal issues, as such, were never raised again within the GATT framework. But this seeming debacle for treaty law was to prove to be progress
GATr, BASlc INS-Ns
urNTs, 7th Supp., at 70 (1958).
105 Id. at 71. For an independent study of the legal issues, see ALLEN, THE EuROPEAN
COMMiON MAR=ET AND Tm GATE (1960).
104
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both for GATT as an international organization and for the cause of freer
trade in the world economy. Attention was "directed to specific and practical
problems," as the Intersessional Committee had recommended, on several
different levels.
(c) The Haberler Report. The formation of the association of overseas
territories, with its inevitable far-reaching effects on world patterns of trade
in primary products was an important influence in the decision of the Contracting Parties to embark upon a Trade Expansion Program. While the Program was not formally inaugurated until the Thirteenth Session in 1958, a
significant first step was taken at the Twelfth Session in 1957 which appointed
a group of economic experts to take stock of current trends in international
trade. This report, known as the "Haberler Report" in recognition of the
stature of its chairman, Gottfried Haberler, was a powerful document which
profoundly influenced future activities of GATT.106
One of the topics considered in the Haberler Report was the effect of the
EEC on world trade. In general, it was concluded that "provided that certain
conditions are fulfilled the trade-creating effects in Europe should outweigh
the trade-diverting effects; and in this case the higher level of industrial output
and the increased level of real incomes in Europe should lead to a greater demand for raw materials and foodstuffs, part of which should increase imports
from outside sources."' 07 The Report urged that EEC external tariffs should
be kept as low as possible through tariff negotiations with third countries in
order to increase the likelihood that trade-creating efforts would outweigh
trade-diverting effects (that is, that positive production effects would outweigh negative production effects).108 The Report criticized the agricultural
provisions of the Rome Treaty on the ground that they did not assure that
intra-EEC trade in agricultural commodities would be freed. By permitting the
EEC members to choose which commodities would be freed, the Treaty made
possible "the sheltering of uneconomic forms of production."1 09 The harshest
criticisms were directed at the overseas territories arrangement. The freeing
of trade between the Six and the overseas territories, coupled with retention of
barriers against third countries, "will be predominantly trade diverting and not
trade creating.""10 This conclusion:
follows from the fact that larger imports of coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas from
the French and Belgian overseas territories into the EEC cannot displace
high-cost production of these commodities there, since these countries do
106 GATT, TRENDs IN INTFRNATiONAL TRADE (1958). Other members of the group were
James Meade, Jan Tinbergen and Roberto de Oliveira Campos. It is interesting to note that
Professor Meade, perhaps as much as any other economist, has contributed to that portion
of international trade theory concerned with regional groupings. See, e.g., MEADE, THE
THEoRY or CusToMs UNIONS (1955).
107 GATT, TRENDs ir INrERNATIoNAL TRADE 116 (1958).
108 See note 29 supra.
109 GATT, Ta'-Ds iN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 118 (1958).
"1d.
at 120.
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not grow coffee, cocoa, tea and bananas. While larger importations of
competitive food (and other competitive products) from the preferred
areas, in addition to displacing imports from the outside world ("trade
diversion"), leads to a more efficient pattern of production inside the economic union ("trade creation"), larger imports of non-competitive food
following a preferential reduction in revenue duties can in the nature of the
case not lead to a more efficient reshuffling of productive resources.",
(d) Programfor Expansion of InternationalTrade. The Haberler Report
galvanized the Contracting Parties into unprecedented efforts to deal with
some of the major problems of world trade. A Program for Expansion of
International Trade was instituted and three committees were formed. In each
case, although the terms of reference of the Committee were cast in general
terms, the Committee considered at length the economic impact of the EEC.
Committee I, dealing with the general level of trade barriers, supervised two
major sets of multilateral negotiations: (1) The "compensation" negotiations
required by paragraph 6 of article XXIV concerning concessions by EEC
members in compensation for increases in duties resulting from the creation
of the common external tariff and (2) the "Dillon round" negotiations leading
to a reduction of duties on a wide range of products, the most important pair
of negotiations being those between the United States and the EEC Commission.11 2 Committee II, established to study the web of special protectionist devices which have increasingly removed agricultural commodities from the
free-trade regime contemplated by the General Agreement, has been concerned in no small measure with the common agricultural policy of the EEC.
Extensive consultations have been conducted with the EEC and may have
been an important influence toward a more liberal, or at least a less illiberal,
Community policy." 3 Committee III, concerned with barriers to exports of
less developed countries, has been concerned with the impact of the association of overseas territories provisions of the Treaty of Rome.114
111
]bid.The Report recognized that, particularly if the common external tariff were kept
low, the increase in consumption within the Six might eventually lead to an increase in total

imports of tropical products from third countries. But even if that could be expected, as the
Six had argued before the Working Party on the Overseas Territories, productive efficiency

could not be said to be improved by the association arrangement. Thus, in the view of the

Haberler Report, both the Six and the third countries had used improper criteria in the discussions before the Working Party on Overseas Territories.
112

See I U.S. DEP'T. op STATE, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: ANALYSIS
oF UNITED STATES NEGOTiATIONS, i-ix, 1-27 (Commercial Policy Ser. No. 186,1962); GATT,
THE ACrIvrrITEs oF GATT 1961-62, at 8-11; GATT, BAsIc INSTRUmENTs, 8th Supp., at

101-21 (1960).
113 GATT, BASIC INSTRUmENTS, 8th Supp., at 121-31 (1960); id., 9th Supp., at 110-20
(1961); id., 10th Supp., at 135-67 (1962); GATT', GATT PRoGRAMME FoR EXPANSION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TRADE IN ArRicuLTuRAL PRODUCTS (Second and Third Reports of
Committee I) (1962); GATT, TBE Acrnvms oF GAT 1961-62, at 11-13 (1962).
114 GAT, BASIC INsTRumENTs, 8th Supp., at 132-41 (1960); id., 9th Supp., at 120-69
(1961); id., 10th Supp., at 167-99 (1962); GATr, THE ACTIVITIES oF GAT 1961-62, at

14-19, 35-38 (1962).
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(e) Association of Greece with the European Economic Community. Despite
the various developments just canvassed suggesting a heightened awareness
by the Contracting Parties of the factors governing the impact of customs
unions and free-trade areas on the world as a whole, the formal review by
GATT in 1962 of the Agreement of Association with Greece failed to reveal
any fundamental departure from the earlier legalistic approach. The Association, in form a customs union to be perfected over a twenty-two-year transitional period, was subjected to much the same detailed provision-by-provision
scrutiny as had been the Treaty of Rome and no consideration was given to
the fundamental issue whether the Association was to be a movement toward
or away from free trade. Again the Contracting Parties declined to pass on
115
the legal issues.
E. The EuropeanFree Trade Association
The Stockholm Convention creating the seven-nation European Free Trade
Association was a British-led response to the formation of the EEC and to the
breakdown of negotiations for a free-trade area composed of the seventeen
members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation."16 That
EFTA had much more limited goals than the EEC is revealed in the three
principal ways in which the two regional groupings differed: (1) EFTA was a
free-trade area, rather than a customs union; (2) no provisions were included
in the Stockholm Convention for removing restrictions on free movement of
capital and labor; and (3) agriculture, rather than being subjected to a special
regulated regime, was totally excluded from the scope of the Stockholm Con17
vention.
The exclusion of agriculture (and also of fisheries) from the scope of the
Stockholm Convention cast doubt on its compatibility with the requirement
of article XXIV (8)(b) that duties and other restrictive regulations be eliminated on "substantially all" intermember trade. The Seven advanced a strong
argument for compatibility. "Substantially all" was clearly less than "all,"
and if one examined the statistics, it appeared that ninety per cent of all trade
would be freed from restrictions. The opposing arguments were twofold. First,
whatever the statistics might reveal, the exclusion of an entire sector, particularly one as important as agriculture, indicated that the elimination of restrictions had not been extended to "substantially all" trade. Second, the ninety
per cent figure was spurious because it included some five per cent of trade
which would be conducted under bilateral agricultural agreements."18 These
115 For the Report of the Working Party, see GAIT, BASIc INsTRUMENTs, l1th Supp.,
at 149 (1962); and for the Conclusions of the Contracting Parties, see id. at 56.
11
6 On the abortive seventeen nation free-trade area negotiations, see Negotiationsfor a
European Free Trade Area, CmD. No. 641 (1959); FRANK, op. cit. supra note 82, at 202-31.
117 For the text of the Stockholm Convention, see Convention Establishing the European
Free Trade Association, CMD. No. 1026 (1960).
118 The bilateral agreements provided, it appears from the Working Party's Report, for
removal of tariffs and other restrictions by the importing state with respect to designated
commodities, and in that sense could be said to involve the elimination of trade restrictions.
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bilateral agreements allegedly violated the antidiscrimination rules of the General Agreement19 and, in any event, did not involve the kind of elimination of
restrictions contemplated by paragraph 8(b) of article XXIV. In the end, no
agreement could be reached within the Working Party on the "substantially
all" issue.
Another dispute centered around a question which had produced an impasse in the GATT review of the Treaty of Rome-whether quantitative restrictions might be reduced among members of a regional grouping more
rapidly than against nonmembers. The Seven, unlike the Six, recognized the
force of the economic argument that quantitative restrictions imposed against
nonmembers only would often fail to provide the desired protection for one
member's weak balance-of-payments position. Where such differential treatment would be efficacious, however, the Seven insisted that they would have
the requisite power under article XXIV. Criticism in the Working Party deliberations was somewhat muted, however, by the Seven's assurance-an assurance that the Six had been unwilling to give-that they "hoped" to reduce
quantitative restrictions at the same rate against all countries, member and
nonmember.
The Working Party could not reach agreement. 120 Indeed, those opposed to
the Stockholm Convention could not even agree whether any waiver which
might be granted could be justified under paragraph 10 of article XXIV or
whether the Stockholm Convention so far departed from the General Agreement's concept of a free-trade area that the waiver would have to be given
under the more general provisions of article XXV.121 In view of the multiple
disagreements within the Working Party, the recommendation given was that
the Contracting Parties should postpone any action until their next session in
the hope that the various issues could be resolved in the interim.
119 Article XIII, paragraph 2 requires a Contracting Party, in applying import restrictions for any product, to "aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as
closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions ....
The Seven asserted that the agreements,
despite their bilateral nature, were consistent with this and other requirements of article
XIII.
120 A good deal of the Working Party's attention was directed to two interrelated problems: (1) The criteria established in the Stockholm Convention for determining where goods
imported into one member's territory from the territory of another member were not of
"area origin" and hence not entitled to benefit from the elimination of interarea trade
barriers; and (2) the impact on intermember trade of the Imperial Preference system maintained by the United Kingdom in its trade with the British Commonwealth. The EFTA
members largely satisfied the Working Party concerning the appropriateness and workability of the provisions of the Stockholm Convention with respect to these two problems. Discussion of these subjects is omitted here because of space limitations, but there is no doubt
that the means adopted to deal with the transshipment problem are of major significance in
determining the potential impact of a free-trade area on third countries. See note 44 supra;
FRANK, op. cit. supra note 82, at 210-20; see generally Negotiationsfor a European Free
Trade Area, supra note 116, at 104-06.
121One consideration pointing to the latter alternative was that not all signatories to the
Stockholm Convention were Contracting Parties of the General Agreement.
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The Contracting Parties, unlike the Working Party, chose not to defer
decision but rather refused to make any decision whatever. They stated that
"there remain some legal and practical issues which would not be fruitfully
discussed further at this stage" and therefore concluded that the recommendation called for by paragraph 7(b) of article XXIV could not be made. No
specific recommendation was made for annual reviews of the implementation
of the Stockholm Convention. In view of the great inertia which had to be
overcome to induce the ECSC and the EEC to cooperate fully in ongoing
consultations with the Contracting Parties concerning the implementation
of their respective plans and the encouraging results of such consultations,
the failure of the Contracting Parties to require annual reviews of EFTA's
progress was surely a retrogressive step. The Contracting Parties did, however, "welcome" the Seven's readiness to supply further information under
article XXIV(7)(b) and to engage in consultations with any Contracting
Party under the general GATT consultation procedures of article XXII.
An opportunity for what amounted to a first annual review was provided,
however, by Finland's limited accession in 1961 to the Stockholm Convention. Framed as an "association" between the EFTA members and Finland,
its provisions were in general parallel to those of the Stockholm Convention.
The Working Party appointed to review the Agreement of Association found
that it raised the same issues which had produced disagreement in the Working Party reviewing the Stockholm Convention. The Contracting Parties
adopted conclusions almost identical with those previously adopted with respect to the Stockholm Convention itself.122
F. Latin American Free Trade Association
The Treaty of Montevideo establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) presented the Contracting Parties with an extreme instance of a problem which had run through all GATT reviews of customs
union and free-trade agreements. The provisions of the Treaty of Montevideo
concerning elimination of intermember tariffs were so general and the escape
clauses so broad that it was impossible to determine with any certainty what
action would eventually be taken by the member states. With respect to intermember barriers, the Treaty of Montevideo declared straightforwardly that
the member states would "gradually eliminate, in respect of all their reciprocal trade, such duties, charges and restrictions as may be applied to imports of goods originating in the territory of any [member state]."' 23 But,
as we shall see, the more specific provisions of the treaty failed to indicate
how that goal would be achieved and gave every reason for a suspicion that
122 For the Report of the Working Party on the Association of Finland with the European
Free Trade Association, see GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, 10th Supp., at 101 (1962), and for

the Conclusions of the Contracting Parties, see id. at 24. For the text of the Association
Agreement, see Chm. No. 1547 (1961).
123 Treaty of Montevideo, art. 3 (1960).

19631

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND GATT

it might never be achieved. With respect to external barriers, the treaty provided that the members would "make every effort... to reconcile their import and export regimes, as well as the treatment they accord to capital, goods
and services" but there was no indication that a common external tariff was
contemplated and, in any event, the member states at all times represented
LAFTA to be a free-trade area rather than a customs union.124 Thus, while
the Contracting Parties were expected to pass on the legal question of the compatibility of LAFTA with article XXIV on the basis of the treaty itself, the
structure of LAFTA would depend entirely on the steps taken to implement
the treaty.
The Working Party was thus stymied on the one hand by the impossibility
of demonstrating that LAFTA would not comply with the article XXIV
definition of a free-trade area by the end of the transition period and, on the
other hand, by the solemn insistence by those LAFTA members which were
contracting parties that they intended to live up to their obligations under the
General Agreement. The Working Party, and subsequently the Contracting
Parties, therefore decided that no final conclusion could be reached concerning compatibility with article XXIV. The Contracting Parties declared that
"there remain some questions of a legal and practical nature which it would
be difficult to settle solely on the basis of the text of the Treaty, and that these
questions could be more fruitfully discussed in the light of the application of
the Montevideo Treaty." LAFTA members were not required, however, to
submit annual progress reports. Rather, the Contracting Parties contented
themselves with noting the LAFTA members' expressions of willingness to
consult with interested contracting parties of GATT under the conventional
GATT consultation procedures and to provide further information in the
future, albeit at unstated dates and under unstated circumstances.125
The LAFTA case presents most dramatically the consequences of the failure
of the General Agreement to set forth appropriate standards for judging customs unions and free-trade area agreements and of the failure to provide for
formal consultations on the basis of those criteria not only at the time such
agreements are drawn up but also regularly throughout the period of implementation. There were substantial reasons for suspecting that LAFTA would
tend to be a movement away from, rather than toward, free trade. Two dominant factors in Latin American trade prior to formation of LAFTA distinguished its character sharply from that of other regional groupings such as
the EEC and EFTA. First, Latin American countries exported very few manufactured or semimanufactured products either outside Latin America or to
other Latin American countries; rather exports tended to be almost entirely
foodstuffs, fuels and raw materials. The second factor was that Latin Ameri124 Id., art. 15.
12sFor the Report of the Working Party, see GATT, BAsic INSTRUMENTs, 9th Supp., at

87 (1961), and for the Conclusion of the Contracting Parties, see id. at 21.
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can countries traded very little with each other. The dominant trade patterns
were between individual Latin American countries, on the one hand, and
Europe and North America, on the other.
It is no secret that the dominant purpose of LAFTA, as conceived by those
1 26
It
active in its formation, was to enable the member states to industrialize.
seems appropriate to ask how LAFTA was expected to further industrialization. It is, of course, true that in some industries economies of scale are such
that a single Latin American country could not provide a sufficiently large
market to support local manufacturers. But that fact did not explain why individual Latin American countries have not developed export industries for
manufacturers in the same manner as they have for certain primary commodities in which the local market might also be too small to support efficient production (petroleum and nitrates, for example). It is likely that for most manufactured products the real costs of production are much lower outside than inside Latin America. Under all of these circumstances the Contracting Parties
might well have suspected that the purpose of a Latin American free-trade
area, rather than to permit local industries to compete with each other so that
the more efficient would capture markets from the less efficient, would be to
permit local industries in one country to capture markets presently served by
industries outside Latin America.
Two related incentives would lie behind the creation of such a free-trade
area. First would be the protectionist purpose of extending the area of protection for local industries. Second would be the desire to change the terms of
trade and thereby to accomplish a wealth transfer from nonmembers to members. These two types of advantages are quite unlike the gains to be achieved
by a free-trade area which has the effect of permitting local industries within
the area to compete with one another, thereby assuring that production of
each product within the area is conducted by the lowest-cost producer. The
primary purpose of the latter form of free-trade area is to release the forces of
competition within the area, thus promoting the division of labor which is the
raison d'etre of competition and free trade. The production effects of the
former regional grouping will primarily be negative while the production effects of the latter will primarily be positive.
That the Contracting Parties had reason to suspect that the Treaty of
Montevideo would establish a free-trade area of the former kind becomes
even clearer when one analyzes the treaty's provisions. Thus, the basic obligation undertaken by the member states was to grant each year "reductions in
duties and charges equivalent to not less than eight.., per cent of the
weighted average applicable to third countries, until they are eliminated in respect of substantially all of its imports from the Area, in accordance with
126 This is the overriding theme, for example, of an outstanding defense of LAFTA by a
well-known Mexican economist. See URQtrIw, FREE TRADE EcoNoMc INTEGRATION IN

LATIN AMERICA (1962).
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the... Protocol."1 27 The formula set forth in the Protocol, however, includes
within the relevant duties and charges for the purpose of the annual eight per
cent reduction only those on products actually imported from within the area
during the preceding three-year period.12 8The effect of the formula was to exclude from a member's duty to reduce intermember tariffs any products in
which local production had been sufficient in the past to supply local needs. A
member state had no incentive to reduce a protective tariff which was so high
as to exclude all imports, whereas there was a strong incentive to reduce revenue tariffs on products not produced locally where there were some imports
from member states in the past. Thus, the duty to reduce intermember tariffs
was so formulated as to assure that the effects of such reductions would rarely
be to divert production from local sources to member sources.
Furthermore, a large number of exceptions and savings clauses were included which were intended to assure that protection afforded local industries
would not be lessened by the creation of the free-trade area. Thus, in determining the relevant products for application of the formula, each member state
was permitted "to exclude products of little value ... provided that their aggregate value did not exceed five per cent... of the value of imports from
within the Area."' 2 9 This exemption of up to five per cent of imports from
member states could prove to be very important in protecting local industries which have in the past faced some import competition from member
states. With respect to agricultural commodities (which constituted the overwhelming bulk of intermember trade), a member state could apply nondiscriminatory tariffs where necessary to eliminate the differences between local
and import prices and quantitative restrictions where necessary to limit imports to the quantity by which local production fell short of local consumption. In other words, with respect to the great bulk of commodities entering
into intermember trade, there was no duty whatever to increase imports at the
expense of local production.
The member states were permitted, moreover, to enter into agreements for
increased trade in agricultural commodities provided "priority" was granted
to commodities originating within the area. This provision permitted agreements between the member states to purchase agricultural commodities from
one another on a basis which discriminated directly against nonmember countries. The production effects of such an agreement could only be negative.
Finally, the member states could by agreement permit member states "at a
relatively less advanced state of economic development" to impose nondiscriminatory barriers where necessary to protect local production of any kind,
127 Treaty of Montevideo, art. 5 (1960).
128 Protocol No. 1, to Treaty of Montevideo, tit. I. See Mikesell, The Movement Toward
Regional Trading Groups in Latin America, in HIRSCHMAN, LATIN AMERICAN IssuEs 125
(1961).
129 Protocol No. 1, to Treaty of Montevideo, fit. I, art. 7. It should be noted, of course,
that this provision is only applicable during the interim period.
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provided such barriers did not decrease local consumption. Thus, the reduction of barriers by the less developed member states might well be limited
solely to products in which there is no local production whatever.
By emphasizing those portions of the Treaty of Montevideo which tended
to increase the likelihood that the effect on allocation of world resources would
be negative, it is not meant to suggest that the Contracting Parties were irrational in failing to attempt to block the formation of LAFTA. Support for
LAFTA might rest, rightly or wrongly, either on political or on economic
grounds. The economic grounds might be those which apparently motivated
the LAFTA members-that the dynamic effects of industrialization would in
the long-run outweigh any misallocation of world resources.130 For either of
these two classes of reasons the Contracting Parties might have been willing to incur the costs in misallocation of resources. This is not the place to
attempt to measure either the extent of the misallocation or the validity of
the industrialization theory of economic development which motivated the
LAFTA members. What is significant in the context of the present analysis
is that the approach adopted under article XXIV makes it impossible for the
Contracting Parties to assess the magnitude of those costs. Certainly it is only
after such an assessment is made that an intelligent decision can be reached
concerning the compatibility of the Treaty of Montevideo with the principal
objectives of the General Agreement.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed article XXIV from three general points of reference.
First, we have examined the meaning of the article as presently drafted and
have found it ambiguous at best. Second, we have attempted to assess the
soundness of the standards announced in the light of the underlying conflict
between the most-favored-nation principle of article I and the discrimination
inherent in customs unions and free-trade areas. Here the conclusion has been
that article XXIV makes very little sense and that quite different standards
should be adopted. Third, we have reviewed the experience of the Contracting
Parties in applying article XXIV.131 In attempting to reach general conclusions concerning article XXIV, it would be appropriate to determine what generalizations may be made concerning this historic record.
On first impression the historical record is a sorry one indeed. Not a single
customs union or free-trade area agreement which has been submitted to the
Contracting Parties has conformed fully to the requirements of article XXIV.
130 See H.G. Johnson, The Cost of Protectionand the Scientific Tariff,68 1. POL. ECON.
327, 339-40, 343 (1960).
131 The review by the Contracting Parties of the Central American Common Market has
not been analyzed here since, for a number of technical reasons, it has not to date been subjected to full scrutiny under article XXIV. See Report of the Working Party, GATr, BAsIc
INsTRumENTs, 10th Supp., at 98 (1961); Decision of the Contracting Parties, id.at 48; GATT,
BAsic INsmiMmNrs, 5th Supp., at 29 (1956) (earlier decision).
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Yet the Contracting Parties have felt compelled to grant waivers of one kind
or another for every one of the proposed agreements.
It cannot necessarily be concluded, however, that article XXIV has been of
no consequence whatever. The desire to avoid unnecessary friction with other
contracting parties may have been a marginal influence on the structure of new
customs unions and free-trade areas. It is impossible, of course, to know what
form those regional groupings would have taken in the absence of article
XXIV. Only in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association do we
have concrete evidence available. Since most of the early planning was done
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America, we have available a public record which suggests that a desire to
comply with article XXIV, or at least to come respectably close to complying,
was widely held among those who attended the planning sessions. 132 It may
be that, but for article XXIV, a preferential trading arrangement with partial
reduction of internal tariffs would have been chosen in preference to a freetrade area with complete elimination of internal tariffs.
Even assuming that article XXIV has had a significant influence on the
structure of recent customs unions and free-trade areas, it does not necessarily
follow that that influence has been uniformly beneficent. If, for example, as
appears to this writer, the overseas territories provisions of the Treaty of Rome
and the Latin American Free Trade Association as a whole will have, on balance, unfavorable production effects, it may well be that the requirement of
article XXIV that internal restrictions on substantially all trade among member countries be eliminated has had an unfortunate influence. Partial reduction
of internal barriers might well have been preferable to complete elimination
133
from the viewpoint of the world as a whole for the reasons examined above.
The foregoing analysis suggests that, however feeble article XXIV may have
been as a juridical rule in outlawing nonconforming regional economic agreements, the errors in policy underlying the article's formulation have had unfortunate consequences for the world as a whole.
Quite aside from any influence on structural planning, article XXIV, by
proving in practice to be a barrier to summary GATT approval, has forced
the members of some nascent regional groupings to discuss their plans at
length within the GATT framework and to report yearly on the implementation of such plans. These consultations have not only been an important dispute settlement mechanism but also, by making available detailed information
concerning the successes and difficulties of the various regional organizations,
have dissipated ignorance and jealousy which might have led to serious disputes. But because article XXIV has been built on mistaken policy founda132 ECONO.NC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKmr 9397, 100-02, 115-24 (U.N. Doc. No. E/CN. 12/531) (1959); URQUIDI, Op. cit. sulpra note 126,
at 62-73.
133 See discussion at pp. 629-36 supra.
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tions, the discussions have not always been addressed to issues which would
have been the most fruitful from the viewpoint of the world as a whole. The
issue in the discussions has all too often been whether particular nonmembers
will be adversely affected, rather than whether the regional grouping will improve the allocation of world resources.
In reviewing the historical record, one is inclined to dismiss GATT as even
a potentially effective force in regulating the formation of customs unions
and free-trade areas. GATT, as an international organization, is indeed very
weak. There are no judicial, arbitral or other formal dispute settlement
mechanisms built into it. Nor does GATT have power to impose sanctions
for violation of the General Agreement. History makes one dubious of the
possibility of strengthening the organization. The General Agreement was
not intended, of course, to be the charter of an international organization. It
was in conception a multilateral trade agreement designed to preserve the
fruits of a general tariff reduction pending the creation of the International
Trade Organization. When ITO proved stillborn, the General Agreement was
seized upon as the most convenient existing framework in which to pursue the
objectives of the ITO.134 Since the institutional structure planned for ITO did
not exist in the GATT, it was only with some ingenuity that a modest Secretariat could be organized and intersessional procedures devised to provide
some continuity between the periodic meetings of the Contracting Parties.
Amendments to the General Agreement intended to provide more administrative centralization were decisively rejected by the United States Senate in
1955, even though no provision for sanctions or for arbitral or quasi-judicial
sanctions was included. Given this history, any attempt to reform article
XXIV must surely accept the severe institutional restraints under which GATT
functions as the point of departure.
Even if one is so pessimistic as to hold that GATT is hopelessly ineffective
and that any restraints on the structure of new customs unions and free-trade
areas must operate within the context of traditional diplomacy, the revision of
the standards of article XXIV and extension of GATT consultation procedures would be a useful step forward. If the only effect of such changes were
to raise the level of public discourse concerning the impact of regional economic arrangements on the world as a whole, the changes would be worth the
making. An improvement in both the objectives and the efficacy of traditional diplomacy in assessing and dealing with economic regionalism might
follow. It must be recognized therefore that if disputes are to be settled within
the GATT framework, it must be by consultation. In any revision of article
XXIV it would be preferable to make the best of these unfortunate circumstances by requiring formal consultation among interested Contracting Parties
prior to the entry into force of any customs union or free-trade area agree134 On the demise of the ITO, see GARDNER, STERLING-DoLLAR DiPLoMAcy 348-80
(1956).
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ment. In the case of interim agreements, yearly consultations should also be
required, such consultations to be based on annual reports concerning
progress and future plans by the customs union or free-trade area. In order to
assure that these consultations, unlike the consultations we have reviewed
above, are directed to the questions which are most relevant from the point of
view of all Contracting Parties, the revised article XXIV should set forth in
some detail the criteria for judging whether a proposed customs union or freetrade area is a movement toward or away from free trade. We have tried to
suggest some appropriate standards in Part III above.
All consultations would be held within the GATT framework with the
Secretariat perhaps acting as a mediating body. Such an institutionalized consultative procedure, conducted in the light of previously agreed-upon standards, would be to consult in good faith on the basis of the specified standards,
but there would, of course, be no obligation to reach any particular agreement.
Perhaps revision of article XXIV is impossible at this time, particularly in
view of the large number of contracting parties which are members of existing
customs unions or free-trade areas and which therefore have a vested interest
in the legal status quo. In that event, some progress might be made within the
context of the existing formulation of article XXIV by a reinterpretation of its
provisions by the Working Parties assigned to review new regional arrangements. The very ambiguity of article XXIV provides an opportunity if primary emphasis can be placed on the statement in paragraph 4 that "the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties."'135 It has been the burden of the analysis undertaken
here that a regional arrangement with negative production and consumption
effects tends "to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties"
whether or not it meets the tests laid down in the remaining paragraphs of
article XXIV while a regional arrangement with positive production and consumption effects facilitates intermember trade without raising such barriers.
Barring revision, the best approach may thus be a creative reinterpretation of
article XXIV.
APPENDIX
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XXIV RELEVANT TO CUSTOMS
UNIONS AND FREE-TRADE AREAS
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom
of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of close integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They
135 A construction of article XXIV which would place primary emphasis on paragraph 4
while treating paragraphs 5 to 9 as an illustration of possible approaches to the basic test of
paragraph 4 was advanced by certain members of Sub-Group A considering the Treaty of
Rome. See GAIT, BAsIc INsTRmumNTs, 6th Supp., at 71 (1957).
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also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union
or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for
the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that:
a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect
of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories
prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement as the case may be;
b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the
trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement,
as the case may be; and
c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such
a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5(a), a contracting
party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions
of Article I, the procedure set forth an Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reductions brought about in the corresponding
duty of the other constituents of the union.
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or
free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a
union or area, shall promptly notify the CoNTRACTING PARTrs and shall make
available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as
will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting
parties as they may deem appropriate.
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that
agreement and taking due account of the information made available in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph (a), the CoNTRAcTING PARTins
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find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties
to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement.
The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph

5(c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request
the contracting parties concerned to consult with them if the change seems
likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of
the free-trade area.
8. For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a
single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and
XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially
all the trade in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties
and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union;
b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be
eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations with contracting parties affected. This procedure of negotiations with affected contracting parties shall,
in particular, apply to the elimination of preferences required to conform with
the provisions of paragraph 8(a)(i) and paragraph 8(b).

10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9
inclusive provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs
union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.

